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Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District injected significant confusion into negotiations over
land development approvals. The principal source of this confusion is the
majority’s unwillingness to clarify when and how a proposed condition
offered in a negotiation becomes a demand that triggers heightened
scrutiny under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court
decided that government demands made prior to a later denial must be
evaluated in the same manner as conditions imposed as part of an approval.
Specifically, conditions designed to mitigate harmful development impact
that are demanded from an applicant prior to a denial must now satisfy the
heightened-scrutiny requirements of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard instead of the relatively
deferential Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City takings test.
This heightened scrutiny will likely cause land use boards to be more rigid,
and therefore less creative, in the development approval processes.
While not fatal to land use negotiations, this expansion of the Nollan–
Dolan scrutiny will have consequences. Because Koontz now requires
government offers in negotiations to meet this more exacting standard, the
practical effect of Koontz is that land use boards get more favorable
judicial review by denying noncompliant proposals without suggesting
mitigating conditions. This will lead prudent boards to favor denials over
negotiation as a way to preserve their advantage if a property owner
challenges their decision in court as an unconstitutional taking without just
compensation.
This Article explains why Koontz makes land use negotiations less
efficient and describes several ways land use boards can protect themselves
while still taking advantage of opportunities in negotiation. Part I looks at
the law of exactions in light of Koontz. Part II discusses the important role
of negotiation in the land use approval process. Part III explores the
consequences of Koontz on future land use negotiations and explains how
courts can help maintain the efficiency of land use negotiations in the face
of the challenges created by Koontz. Part IV suggests that land use boards
have the following options when approving land use developments: avoid
negotiation; facilitate negotiation without participating; negotiate without
making proposals; negotiate; or attempt to insulate negotiations.
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I am grateful for the helpful comments received from John Echeverria, Timothy Mulvaney, John
Nolon, Charles Pillsbury, and Sarah Schindler, as well as from numerous participants at Vermont
Law School’s Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship and the Quinnipiac-Yale Dispute
Resolution Workshop. Thanks also to Michael Campinell and Kammeron Todd for superb research
and editing.
171

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

172

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................173
I.

LAND USE EXACTIONS—NOLLAN, DOLAN, AND
KOONTZ..................................................................................176
A. Heightened Scrutiny for Exactions ................................178
1. Physical Exactions ....................................................181
a. Resource Conservation ....................................181
b. Public Access ...................................................181
c. Fee Simple Transfer .........................................182
2. Monetary Exactions ..................................................182
a. Payments in Lieu of a Physical
Dedication ........................................................182
b. Impact Fees ......................................................183
c. Mitigation Measures ........................................184
B. Imposed Exactions Under Nollan and Dolan .................185
C. Proposed Exactions Under Koontz ................................188
D. Exactions Post-Koontz ...................................................191

II.

NEGOTIATING DEVELOPMENT APPROVALS ............................192
A. The Legal Framework for Development
Negotiations ....................................................................193
B. Supplementing the Required Decision-Making
Process ............................................................................196
C. Creating Value in Negotiation—The Potential
for Gain ...........................................................................199
D. Claiming Value in Negotiation—The Potential
for Abuse .........................................................................200

III.

BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF KOONTZ ..............................202
A. The Shadow Cast.............................................................203
B. Comparing Apples (Imposed Demands) to
Oranges (Proposed Demands) ........................................208

IV.

POST-KOONTZ OPTIONS FOR LAND USE BOARDS ...................211
A. Avoid Negotiation—Deny If Noncompliant
and Approve If Compliant ...............................................211
B. Facilitate Negotiation Among Stakeholders ...................212
C. Negotiate Without Offering Conditions ..........................215
D. Negotiate .........................................................................216
E. Insulate Negotiations—Ensure Proposals Do Not
Become Demands ............................................................216

CONCLUSION .........................................................................................219

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/4

2

Nolon: Bargaining for Development Post-<i>Koontz</i>: How the Supreme Co

2015]

BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT POST-KOONTZ

173

INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District1 will drastically change the way
thousands of land use boards interact with landowners seeking to develop
their land. Post-Koontz, any suggestions made by the government during
the development review process may become subject to a heightened level
of judicial scrutiny. While the rationale for this greater oversight is to
protect property owners from extortionate demands of government, the
practical effect of this oversight will be to impede developers’ ability to
improve their projects in the development review process. This Article
addresses the complications the Koontz ruling presents for landowners and
land use boards when they are negotiating over noncompliant applications.
In 1994, Coy Koontz Sr. submitted an application to Florida’s St. Johns
River Water Management District (the District) to develop 3.7 acres of
wetlands in exchange for placing a conservation easement on his remaining
eleven acres of land.2 The technical staff of the District informed Koontz
that his proposal did not comply with existing regulations.3 A compliant
application would have protected ten acres of non-wetlands for each acre
of wetlands destroyed.4 Before the District staff recommended to their
governing board that the application be denied, they gave Koontz several
options.5 Among those options, they suggested that Koontz resubmit a
compliant application that only destroyed one acre of wetlands while
preserving the remaining acreage of the parcel.6 They also suggested that
Koontz could develop the 3.7 acres if he agreed to spend money to
improve wetlands at another location in the same watershed.7 Koontz
refused the District’s suggestions and sued, alleging that the District’s
denial after he refused to accede to their suggestions amounted to a taking
without just compensation.8
For over three decades, the Supreme Court has held land use boards to a
heightened standard of review when they require noncompliant
development proposals to dedicate a portion of their property as a
1. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
2. Id. at 2592.
3. Id. at 2593.
4. Brief for Respondent, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586
(2013) (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6694053, at *12; see Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593 (noting that the
District wanted Koontz to proceed with the 3.7-acre development project and to “enhance[]
approximately 50 acres of District-owned wetlands”).
5. Final Order, In re Coy A. Koontz Wetland Res. Mgmt. Permit Application No. 12-0950109A, Case No. F.O.R. 94-1498, at 1626–29 (St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. filed June 9,
1994) [hereinafter Final Order, No. F.O.R. 94-1498].
6. Id. at 1628–29.
7. Id. at 1627–28.
8. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–93.
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condition of their approval.9 If these dedications—commonly called
“exactions”—took place outside of the approval process through
condemnation proceedings, they would violate the property owner’s Fifth
Amendment right to be protected from government takings “without just
compensation.”10 The Court justifies this heightened review on the premise
that property owners need to be protected from the government’s ability to
circumvent the Takings Clause by demanding property “exactions” through
the development approval process.11
Exactions are demands for dedications of land and payment of fees in
exchange for permission to develop land more intensively than otherwise
permitted.12 The purpose of an exaction is to mitigate the potential harm
caused by a development that does not comply with existing laws.13
Because these demands can approximate non-compensatory takings that
violate the Fifth Amendment, the Court requires governments to show that
a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” exist between the exaction and the
threatened harm. The two cases imposing these requirements are Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission14 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.15 The
“nexus” requirement of Nollan obligates the government to show that the
burden imposed on the landowner is connected to the authority of the
board.16 For example, a government that issues a demand to protect
wetlands in exchange for permission to destroy wetlands must be
authorized to protect wetlands in the first place. The “rough
proportionality” requirement of Dolan also places the burden on the
approving board to show that the exaction is likely to reduce the threatened
harm.17 Governments that fail to satisfy the burden that their exactions
meet either requirement may have to compensate the landowner for the
property taken.
This heightened standard is in contrast to the deferential scrutiny used
by the Court when deciding non-exaction takings challenges. The default
approach to non-exaction takings challenges places the burden of proof on
the developer to demonstrate the relevant factors under the analytical
framework established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
9. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–47.
12. Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–79 (1991) (describing an
exaction as a condition attempting to cure a non-compliant applications); see infra notes 65–69 for
discussion of how the term “exaction” is also used broadly to describe conditions placed on
compliant applications.
13. See Been, supra note 12, at 482.
14. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (coining the “nexus” requirement).
15. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (coining the “rough proportionality” requirement).
16. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
17. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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City.18 In these cases, the Court will examine “[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” as
well as “the character of the governmental action.”19 This burden is very
hard for developers to overcome. As a result, courts will afford a more
favorable standard of review to land use boards that deny noncompliant
applications than those that grant approval subject to a condition.20
An open question after the Nollan and Dolan decisions was whether
proposed exactions were subject to the same heightened scrutiny as
imposed exactions. This was one of the questions the Court addressed in
Koontz.21 Clearly, conditions imposed through an adjudicative development
approval process must comply with Nollan and Dolan, but what if a board
proposes a condition, the developer refuses, and the board then denies the
project? Would this proposed exaction be subject to heightened review
under Nollan and Dolan?
According to both the majority and the dissent in Koontz, land use
boards cannot circumvent the Takings Clause by denying the application of
a developer who refused to accede to an exaction demand.22 The Justices
disagreed, however, on what type of pre-approval negotiation behavior
amounted to a “demand” triggering Nollan and Dolan scrutiny. The
majority offered no guidance to distinguish a demand from a suggestion,
offer, or proposal,23 while the dissent explained why no demand was made
in Koontz.24 The result leaves land use boards with little direction about
what form of negotiation behavior will be considered a “demand”
triggering heightened scrutiny. This uncertainty is significant because
exactions are so prevalent,25 and negotiations play such an important role
18. See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
19. Id.
20. While many scholars feared that the heightened review of Nollan and Dolan would
discourage the use of exactions, the impact of the rulings remains unclear. Compare Ann E. Carlson
& Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence Affects
Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 142 (2001) (reporting that a “very large
percentage of municipal planners view the Supreme Court takings precedents favorably”), with Erin
Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use
Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 366–68 (2002) (citing interviews with planners
from Tigard, Oregon, who discuss how “the planning process has become more formal but less
creative” since the Nollan and Dolan decisions).
21. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013).
22. Id. at 2591; id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
23. See id. at 2598 (majority opinion).
24. Id. at 2604, 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
25. Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 623 & n.8 (2012) [hereinafter
Fenster, Failing Exactions] (quoting JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS,
LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 9.9, at 345 (2d ed. 2007) (“An ever
increasing number of local governments—even those without full scale growth management
programs—have adopted policies and programs designed to make new development and not
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in identifying appropriate exactions.26
This Article argues that Koontz will change the way land use boards
interact with landowners who submit development proposals that do not
comply with governing laws and regulations. Pre-Koontz, land use boards
would commonly offer suggestions on how to improve noncompliant
development applications.27 If the developer did not want to incorporate
the suggestions, she could refuse and her application would then likely be
denied.28 If she challenged the denial as a taking, she would have to show
how the board’s denial went too far under Penn Central.29 However, postKoontz, the confusion surrounding how a suggestion becomes a demand
will likely cause boards to be more hesitant to offer pre-application
suggestions.30
Part I of this Article looks at the law of exactions in light of Koontz.
Part II discusses the important role negotiation plays in the land use
approval process. Part III explores the consequences of Koontz on future
land use negotiations and explains how future courts can help restore the
efficiency of land use negotiations. Finally, Part IV evaluates the following
options available to land use boards post-Koontz: avoid negotiation;
facilitate negotiation without participating; negotiate without making
proposals; negotiate; and attempt to insulate negotiations. This Article’s
Conclusion addresses some of the implications of this ruling and
contemplates ways that courts applying Koontz can clarify what behavior
amounts to a demand.
I. LAND USE EXACTIONS—NOLLAN, DOLAN, AND KOONTZ
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,31 prevents the
government from taking property for “public use, without just
compensation.”32 This prohibition applies to direct appropriation as well as
existing residents bear the cost of new capital improvements . . . necessitated by the new
development.” (alteration in original)).
26. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 20, at 377.
27. See, e.g., id. at 338, 358–59.
28. See, e.g., id. at 358–59.
29. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 290–
92 (2011) (characterizing the unconstitutional takings theory in Koontz as unusual, but pointing out
that Koontz was unlikely to prevail under the Penn Central test, which is ordinarily applied in
regulatory takings cases); see also infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of the Penn Central test).
30. See infra Part III; see also Jeremy P. Jacobs, Takings Decision Confounds Experts, Spurs
Accusations of Judicial Activism, GREENWIRE (June 26, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories
/1059983522 (quoting Coy Koontz, Jr., who stated that the decision “will give [developers] a
bigger stick to take into court in the future to fight these types of cases”).
31. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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regulations that accomplish the same effect.33 In 2005, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor penned a unanimous decision in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc. to
clarify how the Takings Clause applies to regulatory behavior.34 Justice
O’Connor wrote that “[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just
compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of
private property.”35 She continued, stating the Court had recognized earlier
that “government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be
so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster—
and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.”36
Direct appropriation is typically achieved by the government taking
title37 to land—such as seizing a coal mine to prevent a national strike of
coal miners38—or behavior that results in a complete or partial physical
occupation of land—such as building a dam that causes water to flood
upstream properties.39 As for regulatory takings, Justice O’Connor in
Lingle describes four categories of regulatory takings. She began by
writing that “two categories of regulatory action [will generally] be deemed
per se takings.”40 The first of these two categories occurs “where
government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of
her property—however minor.”41 The second per se regulatory taking
category “applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all
economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property.”42 A third category
“involve[s] Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use
exactions—specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an
easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining
a development permit.”43
33. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 537.
36. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
37. Or some form of title such as a conservation easement. See infra note 43 and
accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115–17 (1951) (finding that an
unconstitutional taking occurred when the government seized a coal mine to prevent a national coal
miner strike without providing just compensation).
39. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 182 (1871).
40. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
41. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
42. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992)).
43. Id. at 546 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994) and Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)); see also Been, supra note 12, at 478–79
(“Exactions require that developers provide, or pay for, some public facility or other amenity as a
condition for receiving permission for a land use that the local government could otherwise
prohibit.”). Note that Professor Vicki Been’s definition of exaction specifies that the developer’s
proposal is noncompliant.
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Regulatory takings challenges that fall outside of these three categories
are constrained by the guidelines established in a preceding case44—Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.45 Under Penn Central, the
fourth category, courts look to “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”46 The courts also
look to whether “the character of the government action” more closely
resembles a physical occupation or diminution of a property interest than a
“public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.”47 While the Penn Central factors have “given
rise to vexing subsidiary questions—[they] have served as the principal
guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the
physical takings or Lucas rules.”48 While not setting out a bright-line
rule,49 the Court held that the Penn Central factors have “particular
significance” for evaluating regulatory takings claims.50 Using the
framework of Lingle, determining the category of a regulatory taking is
relatively simple. Regulations that impose a physical occupation fall in the
first category. Regulations that remove all economically viable use fall into
the second category. Government demands that development be
conditioned on the dedication of property fall into a third category of
exactions. And everything else falls into the final fourth Penn Central
category of takings.
A. Heightened Scrutiny for Exactions
Under all but the exaction cases, the burden is on the property owner to
prove the facts of her case.51 Once she shows that the regulation results in
forced occupation,52 or no economically viable use remains,53
compensation is required under the Takings Clause. Similarly, under Penn
44. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
45. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46. Id. at 124.
47. Id.
48. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; see supra note 42 and accompanying text for the requiments of
Lucas.
49. See Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA.
C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 25, 27 (2013) (“In the 30 plus years since Penn Central, the Court has
struggled to create a sense of coherence in its interpretation of the Takings Clause in general and the
Penn Central test in particular.”); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need to
Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and Principles, 34
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315, 351 (2010) (referencing the “confusion surrounding the
three-prong analytical inquiry of Penn Central”).
50. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
51. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has
acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”).
52. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
53. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
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Central, the landowner must prove that the government regulation does not
meet the standards.54 These review standards set a high bar for landowners
to overcome when asking a court to decide whether a regulation violated
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, when a land use
board demands an unconstitutional condition in the course of an
adjudicative development decision the Court applies a different test.55
Exaction cases arise in the context of a development application. When
a property owner submits an application to develop her land, the governing
land use board must follow an adjudicative process to determine her right
to develop. If the development application does not comply with the
governing land use laws and regulations, the board can suggest conditions
that would bring the application into compliance. If a condition
appropriates the applicant’s property rights, the Court will apply a stricter
test to determine whether the conditions amount to a compensable taking.56
The Court’s logic is that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against
uncompensated takings cannot be circumvented by a condition that
expropriates land or money as part of a development application unless the
nexus and rough proportionality tests from Nollan and Dolan are met.57
The Court said that exaction cases:
involve a special application of the “doctrine of
‘unconstitutional conditions,”’ which provides that “the
government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right—here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to
the property.”58
Nollan and Dolan address the special context presented by exactions and
hold that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine prevents a land use board
from doing indirectly what it cannot do directly.59 When evaluating
54. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128–29.
55. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) (clarifying that the burden of
proof is placed on the government).
56. See id. at 391.
57. See id. at 385–86, 398.
58. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at
385).
59. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (“Under the . . . doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.”);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“In short, unless the permit condition
serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546
(“[H]ad the government simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per
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exactions, the Court requires the government to show that any proposed60
or imposed exaction (e.g., a condition) bears an “essential nexus”61 to the
threatened harm and that the condition is “roughly proportionate” to the
extent of the harm.62 Nollan and Dolan place the burden on government.
When a landowner challenges a proposed or imposed condition, the
government must prove that the nexus and rough proportionality
requirements are satisfied.63
In practice, the impact of this heightened exaction burden means that
the government has a more favorable standard of review when denying
noncompliant development applications than it does when offering or
requiring conditions that bring the project into compliance.64 By placing a
higher burden on land use boards that try to improve noncompliant
applications, the Court is inadvertently discouraging negotiation of
development projects. In order to lay a better foundation for understanding
the impact of the Court’s rulings on government behavior in the following
Parts, the remainder of this Part examines the nature of exactions and the
Court’s treatment of them in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.
The types of conditions discussed in this Article are commonly referred
to as exactions.65 While this term is an imperfect label, its use is firmly
established. “Exaction” implies that extortionate intent motivates the
government’s desire to negotiate.66 The term has negative associations, but
se physical taking.”). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1415, 1456–64 (1989) (explaining how the nexus requirement is used to address the Court’s
inconsistent rulings on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and noting that cases such as
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932), hold that government can rightly condition any benefit
it could deny, while Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), holds that
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly).
60. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013).
61. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
62. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (holding that “the city must make some sort of individualized
determination” of the relationship between the condition and the threatened impacts).
63. Id.; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
64. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999)
(concluding that Nollan–Dolan does not apply when the property owner challenges the denial of
development).
65. See Been, supra note 12, at 478–83 (providing additional analysis of various forms of
exactions); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 181 (2006) (discussing the practice of
requiring exactions as a land development condition imposed by local governments); Stewart E.
Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (1988) (defining an
exaction as a single tax on land value). See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZIBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993)
(evaluating the widespread use of exactions and the political, legal, equitable, and practical
implications resulting from their use).
66. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 & n. 61(2000) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
“exaction” as “[t]he wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or
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it is also not adequately specific. Municipalities use exaction as a catchall,
referring to a wide range of government behaviors.67 At least one author
has described exactions as “requirements that local governments impose as
conditions to their grants of permission for a building or subdivision.”68
Specifically, the types of conditions that landowners see as exactions
include “mandatory dedications of land, fees required in lieu of dedication,
and impact fees.”69
1. Physical Exactions
Exactions may be physical in nature. Physical exactions can take the
form of resource conservation easements, public access easements, or
actual title transfers, among others. These forms of exactions are discussed
in turn in the following Subsections.
a. Resource Conservation
Land use boards can mitigate the impact that a development has on a
community resource by requiring the dedication of a conservation
easement on a portion of the property. The conservation easement will
restrict the future use of the property to protect designated resources. For
example, communities have used conservation easements extensively to
preserve prime agricultural soils, scenic views, wildlife habitats, wetlands,
and other valuable community resources.70 In Koontz, the landowner
offered to place a conservation easement on 11 of the 14.9 acres of his
parcel to protect the remaining wetlands and wildlife.71
b. Public Access
Communities also use exactions to grant public access. Some boards
may require an easement permitting the public some right to enter the
applicant’s property. This right to access can be limited or unlimited. The
reward for his services, under color of his official authority, where no payment is due” and directing
readers to also see the definition of “extortion”)) (explaining and arguing that “extortion” is a
synonym for “exaction”).
67. See Been, supra note 12, at 478–83 (describing the history of exactions as an effort by
municipalities to have developers fund the infrastructure improvements required for their
developments).
68. Id. at 473 n.2. Of course, in light of Koontz, this definition should now read:
“requirements that local governments propose and impose . . . .”
69. Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 613 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Formalism and
Regulatory Formulas].
70. John R. Nolon, Managing Climate Change Through Biological Sequestration: Open
Space Law Redux, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 242–43 (2012) [hereinafter Nolon, Managing Climate
Change]; see also Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of
Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 136 (2011).
71. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–93 (2013).
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California Coastal Commission imposed a limited right of access in Nollan
when it required a lateral access easement allowing the public to traverse
along the shoreline.72 This easement specifically prohibited public
loitering, sunbathing, or similar activity.73 Under different circumstances,
the government may request an easement granting the public more
extensive rights of access.74
c. Fee Simple Transfer
A board may also request that a landowner transfer complete ownership
of a portion of the property to the municipality or some other entity. These
requests may be for parks or other public purposes like roads, sidewalks, or
other infrastructure requirements. In these instances, the landowner does
not retain any ownership rights as if the board had only imposed a
conservation easement on the property.
2. Monetary Exactions
Exactions may also be monetary in nature. Monetary exactions can take
the form of payments in lieu of physical dedication, impact fees, and offsite mitigation measures, among others. These forms of exactions are
discussed in turn in the following Subsections.
a. Payments in Lieu of a Physical Dedication
Many boards require landowners to make payments in lieu of
dedicating a property interest75 for a variety of reasons. Communities can
use in-lieu payments to help protect resources that might not be located on
the development site. For example, a town can create an acquisition fund to
help the community protect a critical mass of land instead of disparate
parcels. Developers can either dedicate land that has those designated
resources or they can make a payment in lieu of a dedication into a
municipal fund. Municipalities can use these acquisition funds to protect a
wildlife corridor, an area of prime agricultural soils, or a scenic viewshed.
Payments in lieu of dedications can also be voluntary, giving the
72. Brief for Appellee, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133),
1987 WL 864769, at *4–5.
73. Id. at *8 n.3 (“No additional use is allowed, including loitering, sunbathing and the
like.”).
74. E.g., Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926, 930 (D. Haw.
1986), aff’d, 898 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1990), and aff’d, 913 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing an
instance where the city requested dedication of the oceanfront as a public park).
75. Rosenberg, supra note 65, at 202–03 (“The ‘in-lieu of’ fee idea begins the practice of
charging new development, in financial terms, for its contribution for off-site community facilities
when the need for the new facility is related to the population occupying the new residential
subdivision. . . . Today, these fees are commonly used to fund the acquisition and construction of
off-site schools and park facilities and in some jurisdictions, street improvements, flood control,
public resource access, and other public facilities.” (footnotes omitted)).
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landowner the option to dedicate land or money.76
b. Impact Fees77
Impact fees are generally defined as charges on new development
designed to pay for off-site infrastructure expenses that a community will
incur as a result of the development.78 Impact fees “could be imposed to
provide for water treatment and supply, sewage collection and treatment,
solid and/or hazardous waste treatment and storage, roads, bridges, mass
transit, flood control, pollution control, schools, libraries, parks, open
space and recreational facilities, sidewalks, affordable housing, and
artwork.”79 It is not yet clear what types of impact fees trigger Nollan and
Dolan scrutiny under Koontz.80 Lingle specified that heightened scrutiny
only applies to adjudicative decisions and not legislative decisions.81 But
Koontz imposes heightened scrutiny on monetary demands.82 This presents
a problem for impact fees that governments adopt through legislative
processes but administer through adjudicative processes.
How will future courts treat these types of impact fees? Will courts
grant the imposition of impact fees deference as legislative decisions or
subject them to heightened scrutiny because some element of the fee was
administered through an adjudicative decision? One can argue that only ad
hoc monetary exactions like those the Supreme Court addressed in Koontz
should be subject to heightened review. Still, some scholars have raised
concerns that mandatory affordable housing requirements and school
impact fees will not satisfy the rough proportionality requirement because
municipalities do not administer most programs through an “individualized
determination.”83
76. However, some courts have held that payments in lieu of dedications must be based on
findings “‘that a proper case exist[ed] for requiring that’ parkland be set aside or that a fee be
imposed in lieu thereof.” E.g., Legacy at Fairways, LLC v. McAdoo, 906 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (App.
Div. 2010) (alteration in original).
77. Vicki Been, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev, Impact Fees and Housing
Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 141 (2005), http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/
vol8num1/ch4.pdf (noting the existing confusion between the use of the terms “exactions” and
“impact fees,” and conceptualizing impact fees as a form of exaction for the purposes of her
Article).
78. JAMES C. NICHOLAS ET AL., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 1
(1991).
79. Rosenberg, supra note 65, at 205 n.100 (citing JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND
GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 6:31, at 1 (2d ed. 2005)).
80. See id. at 262 (arguing that while some states have imposed higher standards on all impact
fees, the Court’s rulings have not produced a clear rule).
81. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005).
82. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (holding that
monetary exactions are subject to Nollan and Dolan).
83. E.g., Patricia Salkin, U.S. Supreme Court Hands Down Koontz Case, LAW LAND (July 1,
2013), http://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/u-s-supreme-court-hands-down-koontz-case
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c. Mitigation Measures
Beyond dedications of property and imposition of fees, boards may
require applicants to engage in a broad array of activities that mitigate
impacts of the development. When boards are concerned about the harmful
effects of run-off from construction sites, they can require the developer to
build siltation fences or other features that limit erosion.84 When boards are
concerned about the effect of expensive residences on the affordability of
housing in the community, they can require developers to build additional
units of affordable housing.85 When boards are concerned about the impact
of roads on endangered turtles, they can require developers to install
slanted curbs that allow the animals to more easily cross roads that will
fragment critical habitat.86 These mitigation measures require the developer
to spend money associated with their ownership of property, suggesting
that heightened scrutiny would apply under Koontz.
Land use boards may require both on-site and off-site mitigation. If a
development will impact traffic patterns, a board may require the developer
to fund off-site traffic improvements. In Koontz, some of the District’s
suggested mitigation measures included off-site improvements.87 Off-site
mitigation measures obviously present a greater challenge when complying
with the rough proportionality requirement. Boards must make an
(“Are legislated exactions, such as wetland banking, solid waste impact fees, or mandatory
affordable housing requirements, that apply through some formula, subject to Koontz, or is the case
limited to individual permit conditions aimed at a specific project’s impact such as those involved
in Nollan and Dolan? If legislated and formulaic exaction systems are subject to Koontz, will the
‘individualized determination’ requirement of Dolan, not mentioned by either the majority or
dissent, be implicated? If so, how greatly will this affect area- or community-wide impact fees and
other exactions?”). Compare David L. Callies et al., Land Development Conditions After Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Management District: Sic Semper Nexus and Proportionality, A.B.A. *15–
16 (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/state_local_government/
2013/08/Planning_materials.pdf (arguing that many “in lieu of payments” and affordable housing
set aside requirements will fail Nollan–Dolan scrutiny), with Kevin D. Siegel, Inclusionary
Housing Ordinance Developments, PUB. L. UPDATE (July 2013), http://www.bwslaw.com/tasks/
sites/bwslaw/assets/Image/July%202013%20Public%20Law%20Update1.pdf (arguing why Nollan–
Dolan should not be applied to recent California affordable housing cases decided by the Sixth
Circuit).
84. See, e.g., Silt Fence Installation, CLINTON CNTY., MICH., http://www.clintoncounty.org/Departments/PlanningZoning/SoilErosionSedimentationControl/SiltFenceInstallation.
aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2014) (describing when siltation fences are required and when they
should be used for protection against unnecessary siltation).
85. See David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42–43
URB. LAW. 307, 328 (2011).
86. See NICHOLAS A. MILLER & MICHAEL. W. KLEMENS, EASTERN WESTCHESTER BIOTIC
CORRIDOR
21
(MCA
Technical
Paper
No.
4,
2002),
available
at
http://www.lewisborogov.com/sites/default/files/fileattachments/conservation_advisory_council/p
age/4727/bioticcorridor.pdf.
87. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *14–15; see, e.g., supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
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“individualized determination” to show that any off-site mitigation
proposals will address the threatened harm and do so in a way that will
satisfy a judge.88
B. Imposed Exactions Under Nollan and Dolan
James and Marilyn Nollan leased a beachfront lot in Ventura County,
California with a 504-square-foot house.89 They entered into a contract to
buy the property conditioned on getting approval to demolish the house
and replace it with a much larger one.90 Obtaining this approval required a
permit from the California Coastal Commission—a state board authorized
to protect the public’s access to the ocean.91 The Commission found that
the new structure would diminish the public’s visual access to the ocean
and impair the public’s willingness to access the beach.92 The Commission
eventually approved the application on the condition that the Nollans
dedicate a public easement along the shoreline to allow greater access to
the beach.93 This approval was consistent with fourteen other teardowns in
the same area.94 The Nollans then sued alleging that the imposed easement
was a violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.95
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 5–4 majority, held that the
imposed easement violated the Takings Clause because the condition did
not bear an “essential nexus” to the impacts caused by the development
and the Commission’s authority.96 Justice Scalia acknowledged the
Commission’s rationale that the expansion of the house would reduce the
public’s visual access to the beach and, consistent with the Commission’s
report, that such an impediment would discourage the public from
accessing the beach.97 Justice Scalia found, however, that the
Commission’s remedy—a lateral beachfront easement—was not connected
to the interest of preserving visual access.98 He indicated that an easement
for a public viewing spot would have been a constitutional condition
because, in his opinion, it was connected to the harm—reduced visual
access which would lead to reduced physical access—that the Commission

88. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
89. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
90. Id. at 828.
91. Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at *2–3.
92. Id. at *7–8.
93. Id. at *8.
94. See id.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829.
96. Id. at 837–39.
97. Id. at 838.
98. Id. (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the
beach created by the new house.”).
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was trying to prevent.99 The decision in Nollan requires the government to
show that any condition imposed on a development approval (to avoid
harm from the development) is connected to a governmental purpose.100
Without this “nexus,” such a condition becomes the “obtaining of an
easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment
of compensation.”101
Seven years later, the Court added a second—and more demanding102—
criterion for evaluating exactions in Dolan.103 Florence and John Dolan
asked the City of Tigard to approve their application to demolish their
hardware store, replace it with another nearly twice the size, and install a
paved parking lot for thirty-nine cars.104 The Dolan’s application did not
comply with the city’s land use regulations and plans.105 The proposed
additions were consistent with the city’s existing zoning but not with the
city’s development regulations.106 These regulations contained provisions
to protect against harms from storm drainage,107 reduce traffic
congestion108 and protect open space.109 Specifically, the city’s Community
Development Code required developments on property adjacent to the
Fanno Creek and within its floodplain to dedicate land for a bicycle or
pedestrian pathway and flood control protection.110 The city zoning
ordinance also required developments of this type to dedicate at least 15%
of the property to open space.111 The City Planning Commission approved
the application on the condition that the Dolans dedicate a fifteen-foot strip
of land for flood control and the pathway.112 The land dedicated for the
bike path and flood control measures would require approximately 10% of
the lot and the Dolans could count it toward the 15% open-space
requirement.113
Florence Dolan sued “on the ground that the city’s dedication
requirements were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore,
99. Id. at 836.
100. See id. at 837 (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as
the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use . . . .”).
101. Id.
102. Compare Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring an “individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development”), with Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (requiring the government to show a
connection between the imposed condition and the original purpose of the restriction).
103. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
104. Brief for Respondent, Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (No. 93-518), 1994 WL 123754, at *1–2.
105. Id. at *4; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380.
106. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, at *2, *4.
107. Id. at *8–10.
108. Id. at *10–12.
109. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380.
110. Id. at 379–80.
111. Id. at 380.
112. Id. at 379–80.
113. Id. at 380.
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those requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of her property
under the Fifth Amendment.”114 Eventually, the case made it to the
Supreme Court where Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for another
5–4 majority, decided the case “to resolve a question left open by [the]
decision in Nollan . . . of what is the required degree of connection
between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the
proposed development.”115 Because the Nollan Court found no connection
between the imposed condition and a legitimate state interest, it did not
address how related the condition must be to the state’s interest. Therefore,
the Court used the facts presented in Dolan to formulate the requirement
for “rough proportionality” between the condition and the threatened
harm.116
Similar to the nexus requirement in Nollan, the government has the
burden of proving rough proportionality.117 When determining the
proportionate relationship, the Court stated that “[n]o precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the [land use board] must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”118 Applying
this test to the facts of the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that the city
failed to show the requisite rough proportionality because the traffic
impacts were too speculative.119
Eleven years after Dolan, the Court’s unanimous decision in Lingle
reaffirmed the Nollan–Dolan analytical framework. Justice O’Connor
reiterated:
[Exaction cases] involve a special application of the “doctrine
of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’” which provides that “the
government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right—here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to
the property.”120
Through Nollan, Dolan, and Lingle, the Court made it clear that
demands for property imposed through adjudicative approvals trigger
114. Id. at 382.
115. Id. at 375, 377.
116. Id. at 391.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 395 (“[T]he findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system ‘could offset some of
the traffic demand’ is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to,
offset some of the traffic demand.” (citation omitted)).
120. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at
385).
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heightened scrutiny; however, the Court had not addressed whether
conditions proposed in the approval process prior to a denial also triggered
the same review.121 Stated differently, are the government’s actions subject
to the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements if it denies an
application because the developer refuses to convey a property interest?122
In 2013, the Court answered this question in the affirmative.
C. Proposed Exactions Under Koontz
In 1972, Florida passed the Wetlands Restoration Act (WRA) to
regulate “construction that connects to, draws water from, drains water
into, or is placed in or across the waters in the state.”123 That same year
Coy Koontz Sr. purchased a 14.9-acre parcel of land east of Orlando for
roughly $95,000.124 Much of this parcel consisted of wetlands that would
fall under the jurisdiction of the WRA.125 The parcel is located on the
south side of Florida State Road 50 less than 1000 feet from its intersection
with Florida State Road 408.126 A power line easement bisects this
rectangular parcel of land into northern and southern portions.127 Later,
Florida passed another wetlands law making it illegal to “dredge or fill in,
on, or over surface waters” without a permit.128 In 1987, Florida paid
Koontz $402,000 in compensation when they took 0.7 acres of the parcel
through eminent domain to improve State Road 50.129
In 1994, Koontz decided he wanted to develop the parcel and sought
approval to build a shopping mall on 3.7 acres.130 He submitted an
application to the District to fill 3.7 acres of wetlands on the northern
121. See Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 293–99. The following cases have addressed the
circumstance of proposed conditions prior to Koontz: Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 (8th
Cir. 1998), William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark.
1990), Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Ct. App. 1997), and St.
Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). See
Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 293–99.
122. See Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 292–93.
123. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–92 (2013 (quoting
Water Resources Act, ch. 72–299, 1972 Fla. Laws 1115, 1116 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 373.403(5) (2014)) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 2591–92. John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 13
(Vt. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 28-13, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406.
(citing Proposed Final Judgment for Defendant at 45, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (CI-94-5673)).
125. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
126. Id. at 2591–92.
127. Id. at 2592.
128. Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, ch. 84–79, 1984 Fla. Laws 202,
205 (repealed 1993).
129. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 13 (citing Orlando/Orange Cnty. Expressway Auth. v.
Koontz, No. CI87-9182 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 1989) (on file with author) (stipulating the final
judgment)).
130. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
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portion of his property.131 The development proposal included provisions
to fill wetlands, level the parcel, and install a pond to collect storm water
runoff from the developed land.132 In an attempt to comply with Florida’s
wetlands laws, Koontz volunteered to place a conservation easement over
the remaining approximately eleven acres of the property.133 This proposal
did not, however, comply with the governing regulations for wetland
development. District policy required developers to restrict at least ten
acres of upland for every one acre of wetland destroyed.134 But, instead of
denying the permit for not complying with relevant guidelines, District
staff presented Koontz with several alternatives to mitigate the adverse
impacts of his proposal.135 One suggestion involved reducing the proposed
development to one acre.136 Another suggestion would allow Koontz to fill
the 3.7 acres provided he improved wetlands at another location within the
watershed.137 District staff presented several parcels where Koontz could
provide off-site improvement such as fixing culverts.138 The estimated cost
of these improvements was $10,000 but this was never confirmed.139
Consistent with past practices, District staff informed Koontz that “it
‘would also favorably consider’ alternatives to its suggested offsite
mitigation projects if [applicant] proposed something ‘equivalent.’”140
Koontz rejected all of these suggestions and refused to alter his
application.141 District staff then offered additional time to keep
negotiating so as to avoid denying the application.142 Koontz, through his
lawyer, refused.143 On June 9, 1994, six months after receiving the
application, the District denied the application because it did not comply
with the existing regulations.144
Koontz filed suit in Florida Circuit Court on the grounds that the
District’s denial constituted a taking of his property.145 After several years
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 2592–93.
134. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *12.
135. Id. at *13.
136. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
137. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *14.
138. Id.; Final Order, No. F.O.R. 94-1498, supra note 5, at 1623, 1627.
139. Compare Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *15 (stating the amount to be
approximately $10,000), with ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DIST., TRANSCRIPT OF REGULATORY
MEETING 1662–63 (May 10, 1994) (indicating that costs were unknown).
140. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593 (quoting Appendix at 75).
141. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *15.
142. Id.
143. Id.; Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
144. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *16; Final Order, In re Coy A. Koontz Mgmt. &
Storage of Surface Water Permit Application No. 4-095-0474A, Case No. F.O.R. 94-1499, at 1621
(St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. filed June 9, 1994); Final Order, No. F.O.R. 94-1498, supra
note 5, at 1631.
145. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
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litigating the issue of ripeness, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.146 Justice Samuel Alito Jr., writing for a five-Justice majority,
held “that the government’s demand for property from a land-use permit
applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the
government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.”147
Both the dissent and majority in Koontz agreed that a proposed demand
prior to a denial could not be used to circumvent the Takings Clause.148
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the dissent stated: “The Nollan–Dolan
standard applies not only when the government approves a development
permit conditioned on the owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e.,
imposes a condition subsequent), but also when the government denies a
permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition
precedent).”149
However, the majority and dissent disagreed on whether the District’s
actions in this case amounted to a demand triggering Nollan and Dolan.
The majority chose not to disturb the determination of the Florida District
Court of Appeal—relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court—that the
government made a demand.150 But the decision left open the possibility
that the issue could be revisited on remand.151 That the Court did not
scrutinize the nature of the demand more thoroughly is troubling and Part
III will discuss this issue in more depth.
The dissent argued that the question was properly before the court152
and used the record to explain why the District never made a demand of
Koontz.153 Justice Kagan expressed concern regarding the majority’s
unwillingness to clarify what constitutes a “demand” and feared that it

146. See id. at 2594.
147. Id. at 2603.
148. Compare id. at 2591, with id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). While the Justices agreed
that both imposed and proposed demands trigger heightened scrutiny, the result muddies the water
of takings law. The majority stated that proposed demands are not takings, rather they are
“unconstitutional conditions.” Id. at 2597 (majority opinion). However, this conflicts with Lingle’s
finding that exactions, like those involved in Nollan and Dolan, “involved Fifth Amendment
takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 546 (2005). Neither the majority nor the dissent offered advice on how to clear up this
confusion.
149. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion) (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77
So. 3d 1220, 1224 (Fla. 2011)).
151. Id. (“The Florida Supreme Court did not reach the question whether respondent issued a
demand of sufficient concreteness to trigger the special protections of Nollan and
Dolan. . . . Whether that characterization is correct is beyond the scope of the questions the Court
agreed to take up for review. If preserved, the issue remains open on remand for the Florida
Supreme Court to address.”).
152. See id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2610–11.
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would lead to confusion.154 Specifically, she stated:
Nollan and Dolan can operate only when the government
makes a demand of the permit applicant; the decisions’
prerequisite, in other words, is a condition. Here, the District
never made such a demand: It informed Koontz that his
applications did not meet legal requirements; it offered
suggestions for bringing those applications into compliance;
and it solicited further proposals from Koontz to achieve the
same end. That is not the stuff of which an unconstitutional
condition is made.155
This Article agrees with Justice Kagan’s concern and expresses the
hope that future courts move quickly to clarify when a pre-decision
proposal becomes a demand triggering Nollan–Dolan scrutiny. Until that
time, land use boards must live with the current state of the law and
exercise appropriate caution. The remainder of this Article explores the
ruling’s impact on development application negotiations and provides a
framework for land use boards negotiating in a post-Koontz world.
D. Exactions Post-Koontz
The holding of Koontz expands the definition of an exaction. Now
physical, monetary, imposed, and proposed conditions must meet the nexus
and rough proportionality requirements.156 Exactly what this means for
land use boards is unclear.157 These boards are likely to be confused about
what types of suggestions and what types of monetary conditions are
subject to Nollan and Dolan.158 For example, what form of impact fee
qualifies for Nollan–Dolan scrutiny?159 What types of pre-decision
suggestions will be seen as “proposed” demands under Koontz?160
154. See id. at 2612.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 2603 (majority opinion).
157. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 40–41; see Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver,
Exactions Creep 2 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase–Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 665, 2d series 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345028.
158. See Echeverria, supra note 124, at 40–41, 46; cf. Mark Fenster, The Stubborn
Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 528–29 (2009) (discussing the
ambiguity that has arisen from the “fuzzy factors” used in past Supreme Court decisions dealing
with regulatory takings claims); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 99–100 (2002) (discussing the vagueness of past Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence).
159. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 49 (describing the confusion over how the various forms of
monetary payments in land use processes can be distinguished from taxes).
160. See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (using “condition subsequent” for an imposed
exaction and “condition precedent” for proposed exactions, and stating that the Supreme Court’s
“unconstitutional conditions cases have long refused to attach significance to the distinction
between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent”).
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II. NEGOTIATING DEVELOPMENT APPROVALS
That negotiations play a central role in land use decision-making is well
established.161 Many zoning techniques encourage a discussion of
possibilities among municipalities and applicants.162 For a majority of
Americans, the land use decision-making process offers the most direct
access to government decision-making that they have.163 Professor Mark
Fenster noted that “negotiated land use decisions are an essential aspect of
contemporary local American governance, an excellent opportunity for
individual stakeholders to seek political and social involvement in an
accessible set of institutions, and an integral aspect of the creation of a
functional local public economy.”164 There are over 35,000 government
entities that have some form of land use control.165 Because the barriers to
participation are very low, many citizens can be directly involved in these
local decision-making processes.
Municipalities can use a range of deliberative processes—including
negotiation—to involve citizens in the legislative decision-making context
while making legislative decisions, when adopting a comprehensive plan,
zoning regulations, as well as during adjudicative decisions like
development approvals.166 Citizens can participate in development
161. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the
United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 457, 460–473 (2007); Alejandro Esteban
Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality,
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment One, 24 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4 & n.3 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment
One] (citing Ryan, supra note 20, at 347–48 (“[M]ost agree that today, the raw material of most
land use planning is the process of negotiation.”)); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 318–20
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment Two]; Carol M. Rose, New
Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1155, 1168–70 (1985) [hereinafter Rose,
New Models] (describing the prevalence of negotiation in land use decisions and the pros and cons
of mediation as a process option); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls
as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 882–93 (1983) [hereinafter Rose,
Planning and Dealing] (commenting on the prevalence of negotiated land use decisions but also
pointing out the problems that “piecemeal” decisions present for the integrity of the land use
system); see Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 486 (N.Y. 1997) (noting that an open and
inclusive negotiation process plays a legitimate role in land use decision making).
162. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 262–63 (providing examples of
zoning techniques that encourage discussion amongst municipalities and applicants).
163. See, e.g., Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at
15–16.
164. Fenster, Formalism and Regulatory Formulas, supra note 69, at 671.
165. CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY
REPORT: GOVERNMENTS DIVISION BRIEFS 1 (2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf.
166. See, e.g., Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at
15–16 (describing the role of collaborative governance in zoning decisions); Archon Fung,
Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2006) (describing how
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applications through public hearings in ways that acknowledge their right
to be heard.167 They can play a central role by setting the agenda for and
leading ad hoc community meetings that amplify their role in the
development decision.168 Additionally, since many significant development
decisions involve multiple parties and raise many concerns not addressed
by local laws, negotiation is often a more appropriate process than the
more rigid required process.169
A. The Legal Framework for Development Negotiations
While negotiating has become an integral part of land use decisionmaking, these interactions always take place in the context of a defined
legal framework170 established by the states to regulate land use under their
general police power.171 Most state legislatures have delegated this
authority to local governments through some form of enabling
legislation.172 Therefore, to exercise this authority, municipalities generally
develop comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, and land use
regulations.173 To administer these local regulations, municipalities then
create agencies such as planning boards, appeal boards, and planning
different forms of citizen participation can be used for different types of decisions). But see David
L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen Participation
Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (discussing concerns about citizen empowerment (citing JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 23–24, 29 (1985))); Jim Rossi, Participation
Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 173, 177 (1997) (“[P]olitical theorists have often suggested that mass participation is not
always a positive good for democracy.”).
167. Cf. David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision
Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 655 (2006)
(“Processes that citizens value are likely to be processes that citizens use and that enhance citizen
confidence in government, while processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory are likely
to be processes that do not engender meaningful citizen input . . . .”).
168. See Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance
Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 409 (2013) (“Inclusive, decentralized processes
reflect the idea that all stakeholders affected by a problem should be engaged in the process of
solving it.”). See generally Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills,
and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008) (weaving together common themes in negotiation
literature and new governance literature).
169. See Sean F. Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate: Encouraging Collaborative
Approaches to Controversial Development Decisions, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 108–12 (2010)
[hereinafter Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate].
170. See Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 227, 229–30 (2011) (describing the unique circumstances that must be considered when
negotiating settlements of land use disputes).
171. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 3.5.
172. Id. § 3.6.
173. See generally JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO
ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 44–71(2001) [hereinafter NOLON, WELL GROUNDED] (discussing devices
employed by municipalities in exercising land use authority).
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departments.174 These entities may also hire planning consultants,
engineers, enforcement officers, and lawyers to carry out their land use
obligations.
If a landowner would like to develop a significant project on her
property, she will probably need a host of approvals from the local,
regional, and possibly state governments.175 In theory, if the development
application is consistent with governing laws, the land use board will
approve the project. If, however, the application does not comply, the
board can deny the application.176 When faced with a noncompliant
application, a board may also suggest conditions to bring the project into
compliance before issuing a denial.177 These suggestions serve as the
foundation for many land use negotiations.
Because land use boards are constrained in their ability to approve or
deny development applications based on the suite of enabling laws and
judicial rulings controlling their conduct, their negotiation suggestions
must be consistent with their authority.178 For example, a board can only
deny a project because it destroys a wetland if the state has granted the
board the authority to protect wetlands in the first place.179 Imposing
conditions that go beyond the scope of a board’s authority may invalidate
the board’s decision.180 This nexus requirement, as just described, from
Nollan is an effort to identify regulatory requirements that amount to an
uncompensated taking.181 Boards must negotiate within the confines of the
authorities delegated to them.
Despite the delegated nature of their authority, many land use boards
still have considerable discretion.182 In many states, municipalities have
granted local boards significant flexibility when approving development
174. Id. at 95.
175. See Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 108–12 (describing the
unique nature of significant land use decisions); cf. MIKE MILES ET AL., REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS 307–14 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing overregulation as a
major contributor to high land and housing development costs).
176. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
(“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of
responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional
attack.”).
177. See Fennell, supra note 66, at 3.
178. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 3.7.
179. See John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 377–78 (2002) [hereinafter Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism].
180. See generally Frona M. Powell, Challenging Authority for Municipal Subdivision
Exactions: The Ultra Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 637, 640–41, 645 (1990).
181. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“The evident constitutional
propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”).
182. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013)
(“[T]he government often has broad discretion to deny a permit.”).
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applications.183 For example, a landowner seeking to develop residential
housing on a large parcel will need approval to subdivide one parcel of
land into many individual parcels.184 How many parcels and their
configuration will depend on site conditions as well as the relevant state
laws, comprehensive plan, local zoning ordinances, subdivision
regulations, other land use regulations, and any rules adopted by the
approval board.185 The land use boards charged with making these
decisions will apply these laws to the physical features of the parcel and
take into account adjacent land uses.186 In these approval situations, the
board will have considerable flexibility in determining how many lots the
parcel can support and how the lots will be arranged.187
To illustrate, assume that a landowner has one hundred acres in a
district zoned for two-acre residential development. Strict arithmetic
suggests that she could subdivide the parcel into fifty individual lots;
however, after considering the governing laws and physical constrains, the
calculation becomes more complicated. The lot count may be reduced after
removing land for roads, infrastructure—such as electricity and water—
and physical limitations—such as steep slopes, rock outcroppings,
wetlands, and other protected habitats.188 The board may increase the lot
count if it has an incentive ordinance and the landowner agrees to provide
the stated benefit.189 Through this combination of laws and site conditions,
boards have considerable flexibility in deciding what shape a subdivision
will take.190 Similar discretion exists in a host of other contexts such as site
plan approval, wetland permits, special use permits, and environmental
review.191 This discretion is what creates ample opportunity for developers
to negotiate with land use boards and vice versa.
As indicated above, local land use laws are not only restrictive. A host
of tools are available that allow developers to increase their development
potential. Many states grant boards the flexibility to encourage
development192 that is consistent with the community’s comprehensive
183. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 179, at 378–86.
184. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 7.6.
185. See generally id. §§ 7.1–7.22 (providing an in-depth discussion of subdivision and
planned unit development control law).
186. See id. § 7.6.
187. See id.
188. See id. §§ 7.9–7.16 (discussing conservation subdivisions, exactions on subdivision
approval, and mapping for future streets and other public improvements).
189. Id. § 4.18.
190. See id. §§ 7.1, 7.6.
191. See Fennell, supra note 66, at 17, 25.
192. See, e.g., Jason McCann, Pushing Growth Share: Can Inclusionary Zoning Fix What Is
Broken with New Jersey’s Mount Laurel Doctrine?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 191, 204 n.92 (2006)
(“Where zoning districts identify and prohibit certain uses, inclusionary zoning only encourages a
particular type of construction: lower income housing.”); see also Jennie C. Nolon & John R.
Nolon, Land Use for Economic Development in Tough Financial Times, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 233,
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plan of development.193 A local wetlands law may reduce the lot count,
while an incentive zone may permit the clustering of smaller lots to
increase the density of a development.194 Floating zones permit owners of
qualified land to build more intensive developments than the underlying
zoning would otherwise allow.195
B. Supplementing the Required Decision-Making Process
When making these development decisions, boards must follow
procedures enumerated in local, state, and federal law. These procedures
often require an adjudicative format196 designed to protect both individual
and communal property rights.197 These adjudicative processes have
specific timelines, requirements for exchange of information, and public
hearing requirements. As a result, the required decision-making process is
trial-like;198 placing the board as the locus for information exchange and
decision-making. A typical application goes through four stages: (1) the
developer submits an application to the board; (2) the developer notifies
adjacent property owners of the proposal and of the opportunity to
237–39 (2011) (“Many states use enabling legislation or administrative rules to authorize,
encourage, or specifically require that economic development plans be included in a local
comprehensive plan and coordinated with land use planning strategies.”).
193. Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154,
1154–55 (1955); Stuart Meck, The Legislative Requirement That Zoning and Land Use Controls Be
Consistent with an Independently Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan: A Model Statute, 3 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 295 (2000).
194. See Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on
the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991)
(“Through the land use regulatory technique formally known as ‘incentive zoning,’ cities grant
private real estate developers the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for their
voluntary agreement to provide urban design features such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and social
facilities and services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job training.”).
195. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV.
591, 601 (2011) (citing 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 45:1 (4th ed. 2010) (“Unlike traditional zoning by mapped districts, a floating zone
establishes a use classification in the zoning ordinance when adopted by a legislative body but the
classification is not delineated on the zoning map until after a rezoning process initiated by a
property owner.”)).
196. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: DisputeSettlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976) (“Adjudication is conventionally
perceived as a norm-bound process centered on the establishment of facts and the determination and
application of principles, rules, and precedents.”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 368 (1978) (“The proper province of adjudication is to make
an authoritative determination of questions raised by claims of right and accusations of guilt.”).
197. See NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 95–96.
198. See R. Lisle Baker, Exploring How Municipal Boards Can Settle Appeals of Their Land
Use Decisions Within the Framework of the Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, 44 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 455, 455–56 (2011); see also Naved Sheikh, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private
Contracts Replace Public Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 226 (2008); Sterk,
supra note 170, at 228–29.
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comment on the proposal; (3) the board holds public hearings; (4) the
board reviews the application in light of the comments and makes a
decision.199 Most applications move through the process without delay;
however, decisions that will have a significant impact beyond adjacent
parcels often take more time to move through the required process.200
While adjudicative processes minimize the likelihood of violating
legally recognized rights, they are not well suited for more significant
decisions that resist a narrow focus.201 As demonstrated by the subdivision
example above, significant development decisions involve many issues,
implicate many parties, and raise many concerns that cannot be addressed
in a rights-based adjudication. Relying on adjudicative processes to
administer this type of a decision creates problems.202 Without clear
standards for decision-making, the adjudicator will have difficulty
justifying one outcome over another in a way that satisfies the multiple
parties involved. Scholars have long recognized that consensual processes
such as negotiation offer advantages in development application.203
Negotiation offers developers, boards, and residents opportunities to find
mutually satisfying alternatives beyond the narrow scope of the required
decision-making process.204
When determining the reasonableness of development conditions—both
limitations and bonuses—parties need to share information. Landowners
199. See SEAN F. NOLON ET AL., LAND IN CONFLICT: MANAGING AND RESOLVING LAND USE
DISPUTES 7 (2013); Baker, supra note 198, at 457–59.
200. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 520–21
(1994) (discussing effects caused by local opposition to undesired facilities); Markell & Tyler,
supra note 166, at 3–8 (discussing the issue of “procedural acceptability” in the context of “hotly
contested” questions such as public decisions with environmental implications); Nolon, The Lawyer
as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 112–15 (“In routine land development matters, this
adversarial dynamic does not interfere with good decision-making; in significant land development
matters, it presents a considerable obstacle.”).
201. See Fuller, supra note 196, at 394 (“The more fundamental point is that the forms of
adjudication cannot encompass and take into account the complex repercussions that may result
from [a polycentric task].”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 793 (1984) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation] (arguing that an adversarial mindset will
result in a narrow set of solutions). But see Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–93
(describing how mediation can be used as an alternative process to supplement the required process
for piecemeal changes).
202. See Fuller, supra note 196, at 394–95.
203. E.g., Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment Two, supra note 161, at 270–
71; Fenster, Formalism and Regulatory Formulas, supra note 69, at 671; John R. Nolon,
Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 32 (2006); Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–93; Ryan, supra note 20, at
338; Sterk, supra note 170, at 229–30.
204. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFERY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 140–44 (1987) (describing how
negotiation supplements the required decision-making process but does not substitute for it).
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need to share information about the conditions of the site. Boards need to
share information about their limitations and what authority they have to
protect and improve community resources. Community members need to
share information about their concerns. Unfortunately, the adjudicative
nature of the required decision-making process inhibits the flow of
information among the parties. First, parties need to direct communication
to the board as the ultimate decision maker.205 Second, the process
encourages misinformation and withholding of information as a way to
make the other side look worse in front of the decision maker.206 Third,
adversarial processes discourage creative problem solving by placing the
interaction in an oppositional frame.207 Negotiation, on the other hand,
allows parties to share the necessary information more freely to accurately
determine what conditions are most appropriate. Negotiation offers a more
efficient process when property owners are interested in engaging the
community to determine the right type of project given the characteristics
of the site and the needs of the community.
The liberal exchange of information in negotiation allows parties to
create value beyond the narrow outcomes possible through the required
process.208 Land use laws define the rights landowners have to develop and
authorize land use boards to implement and interpret those laws.209 Unlike
other negotiation contexts where the legal shadow tightly constrains the
parties,210 land use law casts a wide shadow within which parties can reach
agreements.211 As illustrated by the subdivision application process, the
law may give the parties a suite of options to consider. Instead of dividing
a hundred-acre parcel into forty-five two-acre lots as allowed in that zone,
an agricultural overlay ordinance may allow fifty-five lots if they are
clustered onto twenty-five percent of the parcel away from prime
agricultural soils. Similarly, affordable housing incentive zones may offer
developers bonus units if they include some affordable units in their
development. This result is often a more satisfying and appropriate use for
both the landowner and the community because the landowner gets
205. See NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 96–99.
206. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 21–22 (1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The
Trouble with the Adversary System].
207. Gary Mendelsohn, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139, 146 (1996).
208. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 201, at 791
(“The limited remedial imagination of courts . . . narrows not only what items might be distributed
but also how those items might be apportioned.”).
209. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 66, at 18–20.
210. E.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951–53 (1979).
211. See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–89; see also, e.g., Rosenberg,
supra note 65, at 198–201 (discussing the wide legal framework surrounding subdivision regulation
and development).
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additional units for protecting an important community resource. Judicial
decisions restricting this ability to bargain reduce that opportunity to create
value.
C. Creating Value in Negotiation—The Potential for Gain
There are several reasons why development decisions present
opportunities to create value. First, many zoning mechanisms rely on
negotiation to add value beyond the basic uses allowed by the zoning
ordinance. Incentive zones, floating zones, planned unit developments, and
developer agreements are a few examples of zoning instruments that rely
on negotiation to create value for property owners and the community.212
For example, incentive zones inform developers of resources the
community needs and provide a list of development bonuses if those
resources are provided.213 Whereas floating zones rely on negotiation to
help parties identify the appropriate mix of community benefit to
development bonus.214
Second, development decisions are ripe for value creation because they
present multiple issues.215 Disputes involving multiple issues allow parties
to create value by taking advantage of differences in relative priorities
among the parties.216 Development decisions often present many issues for
negotiation including: the type of development allowed; the density of
development; the impact on community infrastructure like sewage,
drainage, traffic, and the number of parking spots required; the protection
of environmental features; and provisions for affordable housing and
212. See Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at 17–20,
22 (describing floating zones, planned unit developments, and other land use mechanisms
dependent on negotiation); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in PublicPrivate Transactions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 937, 953–54 (2009) (describing how these “regulatory
bargains are ubiquitous” in land use transactions).
213. Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of
Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565,
568–74 (1992) (defining and discussing incentive zoning).
214. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at 18.
215. Owen Oplin, Toward Jeffersonian Governance of the Public Lands, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
959, 962 (1994) (pointing out that “[m]ost important policy decisions on federal public land use
and management do in fact involve multiple issues” that present opportunities for creative problem
solving found in negotiation).
216. That multiple issues create opportunities to create value—expand the pie—is one of the
central ideas behind modern negotiation theory. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING
TO YES: NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 58–62, 67, 72, 78 (3d ed. 2011); DAVID
A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–45 (1986); DEEPAK MALHORTA &
MAX BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS 77–78 (2007); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 11–25 (2000); HOWARD RAIFFA
ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF NEGOTIATION 91, 206–07 (2002); Russell
Korobkin, Against Integrative Bargaining, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1323, 1325–29 (2008); Gerald
B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 370 (1996).
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parkland. Negotiation allows parties to create value by trading across
issues, also known as “log rolling”,217 and adding new issues.218 Most
developers recognize that negotiation presents opportunities that do not
exist in the adjudicative approval process.219 A developer may be willing to
add infrastructure needed by the community in exchange for increased
density and a streamlined approval process.220
Third, the presence of multiple parties in most significant development
decisions also creates room for value creation. Multiple parties bring more
resources to the table, which increases the options for reaching
agreements.221 Negotiations can take place with community members
directly or through government boards.222 Whether the parties will
eventually reach an agreement depends on a host of factors such as the land
use regime, market economics, the local culture, the personalities involved,
their history of interactions, and the process used to conduct the
negotiations.
D. Claiming Value in Negotiation—The Potential for Abuse
The prevalence of bargaining in land use negotiations has also created
problems. There is a long and unfortunate history of land use boards
abusing their power in negotiations by overreaching and exploiting
landowners.223 While one can attribute some of this behavior to hard
217. MALHORTA & BAZERMAN, supra note 216, at 59–61 (describing the process of “log
rolling”); see also, e.g., RAIFFA ET AL., supra note 216, at 459–60, 481–82 (providing specific
illustrations of “log rolling” in political decision-making).
218. MALHORTA & BAZERMAN, supra note 216, at 62–65.
219. See Dwight H. Merriam, The Koontz Corner, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Dec. 2013, at 2, 5.
220. See Davidson, supra note 212, at 953 (“[A] private developer may enter into a
community-benefits agreement in exchange for being able to build a project.”); Nolon, The Lawyer
as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 128.
221. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“There are five
types of differences that are all potential sources of value creation: different resources; different
relative valuations; different forecasts; different risk preferences; and different time preferences.”);
see also LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 216, at 45 (“[A] negotiator can also create and claim value
by . . . bringing in a new party.”).
222. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan
and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001); Steven P. Frank, Yes in My Backyard:
Developers, Government and Communities Working Together Through Development Agreements
and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 227, 227 (2009); Selmi, supra note 195, at
593.
223. See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 848–49. See generally RICHARD F.
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1966) (describing the practice
of municipalities enacting low density zoning regimes to be in a stronger position to negotiate with
developers); ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
(1974) (describing the role of land use boards and agencies in the redevelopment of New York, the
lack of public involvement, and the harms caused to existing neighborhoods and residents).
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bargaining, a portion has also been motivated by illegitimate intent.224
Boards have used their bargaining authority to systematically exclude
minorities, low-income residents, and locally unwanted land uses; to push
harmful impacts on neighboring communities; and to extract illegitimate
concessions from developers.225
In response, state and federal governments have placed limits on
municipal authority to regulate land use.226 Congress passed the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in response to municipal
exclusion of religious facilities and prisons.227 After several judicial
decisions in the Mount Laurel cases,228 the New Jersey legislature adopted
the Fair Housing Act of 1985 to curtail local governments’ ability to
exclude affordable housing.229 Indeed, the government’s history of abusing
its discretion may be one of the reasons why the term “exactions” has
become part of the land use vernacular.230
When used legitimately, land use boards can impose conditions to bring
a deficient application into compliance. Because every development
application presents benefits and harms, boards are responsible for
balancing the two. A new commercial development may benefit the
community by bringing more tax revenue and at the same time increase
224. See Been, supra note 12, at 482–83 (identifying five purposes that have been found for
imposing exactions, two of which are illegitimate).
225. See id. (discussing the municipal use of exactions to mitigate traffic congestion, noise,
and environmental degradation; prevent development such as low-income and moderate-income
housing; and take financial advantage of developers); see also Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE
L.J. 1383, 1384 (1994) (arguing that “people of color and the poor are exposed to greater
environmental risks than are whites and wealthier individuals” through zoning control of locally
undesirable land uses).
226. Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention: How
Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89–90 (2011) (describing how the delegation of
police power authority from states to local governments places limits on municipal authority); see
also John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in Land
Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 517–24 (1993) (explaining states’ efforts to restrict the
historical delegation of land use authority to municipalities).
227. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
228. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); S.
Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
229. See John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel
Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 666 (1996).
230. Fennell, supra note 66, at 14–15 (describing the history of how “exaction” has been
used). Of course, there are many other plausible reasons why the use of “exactions” persists. The
fact that courts commonly choose to use the term may be one. Another reason may be an intentional
effort of libertarian scholars to capitalize on linguistic associations that degrade the underlying
notion that zoning is a legitimate governmental purpose. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T
THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004) (describing
conservatives’ coordinated efforts to use specific phrases and terms to frame policy issues).
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vehicular traffic requiring a new stoplight and turning lanes. Land use
boards structuring approval processes to maximize benefits and minimize
harms in such a manner will produce the most efficient outcomes.231
However, trial-like processes—like those of the required adjudicative
approval process—are not well suited to identify appropriate exactions.
Identifying appropriate exactions requires a free flow of information. Since
adjudicative processes are notoriously poor at promoting information
sharing among multiple parties,232 negotiation is the more efficient process
option for determining appropriate exactions.233
III. BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF KOONTZ
Negotiations take place in the context of alternatives. Whether a bargain
can be reached depends on the parties agreeing to a deal that improves their
no-agreement alternatives. The most common alternative in dispute
settlement negotiations234 is to adjudicate the legal issues with the help of a
court or administrative body.235 Divorcing couples negotiate the terms of
their agreement in the shadow of the legal regime that courts will impose
on them if an agreement is not reached.236 Similarly, developers and land
use boards negotiate the terms of development proposals in the shadows
cast by the many laws and regulations governing land use.237 This
“bargaining in the shadow of the law” takes place in many negotiations and
231. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 358
(1995); see also Stewart E. Sterk & Kimberly J. Brunelle, Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res
Judicata Doctrine in Land Use Cases, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1142–43 (2011) (describing benefits
that may be obtained for communities through the land use approval process).
232. See supra Section II.B.
233. See Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 206, at 6, 34;
see also Fuller, supra note 196, at 404 (“The court gets into difficulty, not when it lays down rules
about contracting, but when it attempts to write contracts.”). But cf. Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling
Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 896–900 (2004) (arguing that by sending conflicts to
litigation, parties are delegating their authority to negotiate a solution to the judges).
234. Frank E. A. Sander & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Janus Quality of Negotiation: Dealmaking
and Dispute Settlement, 4 NEGOT. J. 109, 109–10, 112 (1988) (discussing the distinction between
different forms of settlement).
235. But see Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 201, at
796–97 (arguing that while most disputes involve some legal issues, there are often more issues in
the negotiation that cannot be resolved by relying on legal norms).
236. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 210, at 968–69 (describing how divorce
negotiations take place in the context of legal endowments and against the backdrop of judicial
uncertainty).
237. See Sterk, supra note 170, at 229 (describing the considerations of municipal boards
when settling land use disputes); cf. David Markell et al., What Has Love Got to Do with It?:
Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making, 57 VILL. L. REV. 209, 241 (2012) (exploring
how parties’ perceptions affect their attraction to different processes and noting that “while judicial
litigation fares well when monetary values predominate, it does not fare well in protecting
sentimental values”).
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the shadow cast by the law has a direct influence on the way that parties
order their behavior.238
A. The Shadow Cast
A key question after Koontz is how the shadow of the heightened
review for proposed conditions will change the behavior of land use
boards. Will it cause municipalities to favor the absolutism of denials over
the flexibility of deliberative negotiation? Justice Kagan makes a strong
argument that governments “might desist altogether from communicating
with applicants.”239 She offers this plausible hypothetical:
Consider the matter from the standpoint of the District’s
lawyer. The District, she learns, has found that Koontz’s
permit applications do not satisfy legal requirements. It can
deny the permits on that basis; or it can suggest ways for
Koontz to bring his applications into compliance. If every
suggestion could become the subject of a lawsuit under
Nollan and Dolan, the lawyer can give but one
recommendation: Deny the permits, without giving Koontz
any advice—even if he asks for guidance.240
A shift to absolutism was not an unforeseen possibility. Reinforcing the
warnings in amicus briefs filed with the Florida Supreme Court,241
Professor Fenster forecasted similar concerns: “Local governments, in turn,
would become exceedingly wary about offering, or even discussing,
conditions on development, thereby harming not only communities that
would approve development without conditions, but also property owners
who would face summary denials without the opportunity to bargain.”242
Similarly, Professor Timothy Mulvaney opines:
[I]f all permit application denials that followed some level of
failed negotiations were subject to the Supreme Court’s
exaction takings framework based on even one exaction
238. See Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in
Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 697 (2005) (pointing out that many attorneys now
litigate in the shadow of ADR).
239. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“If a local government risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to an applicant
about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so . . . .”).
240. Id. at 2611.
241. E.g., Brief of Audubon as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant St. Johns River Water
Mmgt. Dist. at 7, St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2012), rev’d,
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
242. Fenster, Formalism and Regulatory Formulas, supra note 69, at 641–42; see also
Fenster, Failing Exactions, supra note 25, at 643–44 (arguing that Nollan–Dolan scrutiny of
proposed government demands to which landowner does not accede would unduly impede
negotiations).
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mentioned by the government during those negotiations,
governmental
officials
would
be
forced
into
uncommunicative rejections or unconditioned approvals of
development applications when a more amenable compromise
may have been available.243
In a recent article, Professor Ilya Somin agrees that Koontz diminishes
the government’s ability to negotiate with developers244 and will lead land
use boards to change their negotiation behavior.245 Others disagree, arguing
instead that the decision will have little impact on the way land use boards
negotiate with developers.246 Professor Steven Eagle notes:
[L]ocal governments find conversations and bargaining with
developers very useful and would be loath to give up the
practice. If the price of continuing is to press demands that
they actually are tailored to the applicant’s parcel and
proportionate to the burden of development, the ensuing
utility would seem to far outweigh the costs of possible legal
challenges.247
If the past is prologue, we can perhaps draw a lesson from a similar
debate that occurred in the aftermath of Nollan and Dolan. Some scholars
predicted that the enhanced requirements would have a chilling effect on
the willingness of governments to impose conditions.248 Planners in the
243. Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 307.
244. Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz,
Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215,
216. (“Koontz thereby limits the government’s ability to use permit processes and other land-use
restrictions as leverage to force property owners to perform various services.”).
245. See id. at 230. (“In practice, however, governments can deal with the danger of lawsuits
by restricting the demands they impose on landowners to those that are unlikely to violate the
Takings Clause . . . .”).
246. E.g., Merriam, supra note 219, at 5; see also Callies et al., supra note 83, at 17–18
(discussing the equally likely alternative of development agreements, which would allow local
governments to require exactions prohibited by Koontz).
247. Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 61 URB. LAW. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354617.
248. Jonathan M. Davidson et al., “Where’s Dolan?”: Exactions Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAW.
683, 697 (1998); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 183–84 (1993)
(arguing that Dolan’s nexus “narrows the size of the bargaining range and hence reduces the state’s
ability to extract concessions from individual owners”); Fennell, supra note 66, at 28–33
(describing how the nexus and rough proportionality requirements retard bargaining for efficient
outcomes); Robyn L. Sadler, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Takings Doctrine Remains Vague Under the
Rough Proportionality Standard, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 147, 176–77 (1995) (arguing that the
difficulty in appraising exaction fees for certain types of developments could discourage the
projects entirely); Stewart Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings
Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231, 246 (2004) (“Nollan and Dolan have
altered the takings landscape by reducing the leverage enjoyed by municipal officials in the
planning process. Municipalities often seek concessions from developers as a condition to the
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City of Tigard indicated that the decision steered them away from any
actions that would be questionable.249 Other scholars argued that the fear
was overstated.250 A study by Professors Ann Carlson and Daniel Pollak
indicated that, at least in California, Nollan and Dolan did not end the
practice of conditioning developments: “Contrary to initially negative
reactions to the Court decisions, we found that an overwhelming
percentage of California planners now view the Nollan and Dolan cases
not as an encroachment upon their planning discretion but instead as
establishing ‘good planning practices.’”251
Koontz, however, is different. The shadow it casts over development
negotiation is more complete than Nollan–Dolan and, therefore, more
likely to leave a chill. The imposed nature of Nollan–Dolan conditions—
demands issued as part of an approval—presents a bright line for
determining when a condition must have a nexus and be roughly
proportionate. Koontz obscures that bright line with a thick fog by not
clarifying what behavior will be subject to judicial review. Koontz requires
that all demands made before a decision show a nexus and rough
proportionality between the condition and public harm the condition seeks
to minimize. While the opinion implies that demands should be definite,
concrete, and specific, it does not offer any guidelines to make that
determination.252 This lack of clarity leaves boards wondering when their
suggestions will be considered demands by a reviewing court.
Subjecting early-stage negotiation suggestions to the level of rigor
necessary to show nexus and rough proportionality is problematic. Prudent
boards are likely to retreat from direct involvement with developers and
impose a more formal, ritualized development approval process because
they cannot always be certain of whether their suggestions will be treated
as demands that must satisfy the strict standard of Nollan and Dolan.253
This lack of certainty over how suggestions, offers, or proposals in
negotiations convert into demands triggering heightened scrutiny will have
an effect on land use boards’ willingness to bargain.
Prior to Koontz, boards could rely on the bright-line rule that only
imposed exactions would be subject to heightened scrutiny under Nollan

issuance of development permits. . . . Nollan and Dolan have strengthened the hand of developers
seeking to avoid these concessions.”).
249. Ryan, supra note 20, at 366–68 (explaining that “the planning process has become more
formal but less creative”). Based on Koontz, negotiating the details of a development application
would now be a risky behavior for some planners.
250. See, e.g., Carlson & Pollak, supra note 20, at 142 (reporting that a “large percentage of
municipal planners view the Supreme Court takings precedents favorably”).
251. Id. at 105.
252. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (2013).
253. See infra Section IV.A.
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and Dolan.254 The Court removed that bright line in Koontz by holding that
courts should treat proposed exactions the same as imposed exactions.
While Justice Alito and Justice Kagan agreed that municipalities cannot
use proposed demands to circumvent Fifth Amendment just compensation
protections, they disagreed on whether the District made a “demand.”255
The majority relied on the Florida District Court of Appeal’s determination
that the District had issued a demand and declined to address the
question.256
The Florida Supreme Court did not reach the question
whether respondent issued a demand of sufficient
concreteness to trigger the special protections of Nollan and
Dolan. It relied instead on the Florida District Court of
Appeals’ characterization of respondent’s behavior as a
demand for Nollan/Dolan purposes. Whether that
characterization is correct is beyond the scope of the
questions the Court agreed to take up for review. If preserved,
the issue remains open on remand for the Florida Supreme
Court to address. The Court therefore has no occasion to
consider how concrete and specific a demand must be to give
rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan.257
Unfortunately, this characterization of the District’s behavior as a
demand was little more than that. Judge Robert J. Pleus, in his opinion
concurring with the Florida District Court of Appeal, made the conclusory
determination that the District’s behavior amounted to a “demand” with
little analysis of the issue.258 But the question before the Florida District
Court of Appeal in 2003 was ripeness—specifically, whether the District
could appeal an order by the Circuit Court ruling that the District’s action
amounted “to an unreasonable exercise of its police power.”259 The Court
of Appeal ruled that the District could not appeal the Circuit Court’s
order.260 Judge Pleus concurred “specially” with an opinion that went

254. See Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 290–95 (citing Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861
(8th Cir. 1998), William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark.
1990), Lambert v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Ct. App. 1997), and St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)) (arguing that only a few courts
considered the question of proposed exactions prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Koontz).
255. See supra notes 147–55 and accompanying text.
256. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (implying that a demand should be “concrete” and “specific”
but deciding not to use the extensive record to explain whether the District’s behavior met that
requirement to guide future land use boards).
257. Id. (citation omitted).
258. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268–69 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
259. See id. at 1268 (majority opinion).
260. Id.
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beyond the ripeness question presented to the Court of Appeal.261 A review
of Judge Pleus’s concurring opinion reveals the purpose of his opinion was
“to describe the extortionate actions of St. Johns Water Management
District . . . in this case as shown in the trial below.”262 Other than labeling
the District’s behavior as a “demand,” Judge Pleus offers no rationale as to
what turned the District’s suggestions into demands.
At the Supreme Court, in her dissent, Justice Kagan disagreed that the
issue was not properly before the Court and explored the question of
whether the District had made a demand.263 Instead of relying on Judge
Pleus’s dictum that labeled the behavior as a demand, Justice Kagan used
the record—provided in the parties’ briefs—to explain why the District’s
proposals never amounted to “a demand or set a condition.”264 “[T]he
District suggested to Koontz several non-exclusive ways to make his
applications conform to state law. The District’s only hard-and-fast
requirement was that Koontz do something—anything—to satisfy the
relevant permitting criteria.”265 In addition, the District’s suggestions were
not definite, concrete, or specific,266 the costs of the District’s mitigation
alternatives were not specified, and the transcript of the District’s hearing
did not reveal a convincing case that a demand was made. According to the
transcript, the District had not established the cost of the off-site mitigation
or the cost of the one-acre alternative.267
Because the majority offered no discernible test for what constitutes a
demand, land use boards now have little direction about what negotiation
behavior may subject them to the heightened standard of judicial review.268
This lack of a definition makes it difficult for attorneys to advise municipal
clients about what negotiation behavior courts will see as a demand that
triggers heightened scrutiny. Therefore, it is very likely that attorneys will
advise their municipal clients to be cautious and avoid making preapproval proposals before developers provide adequate information about
the impacts of their projects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that attorneys
are already providing such advice.269
261. Id. at 1268–72 (Pleus, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 1268.
263. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2609–11 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2610–11.
265. Id. at 2611.
266. Id. at 2610–11.
267. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 139, at 1662–67.
268. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95 (majority opinion) (concluding that land use boards
must show that at least one condition, proposal, suggestion, offer or demand made in a negotiation
passes the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests).
269. E.g., Interview with Julie Tappendorf, Partner, Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCanni &
Krafthefer (Feb. 11, 2014) (on file with author) (discussing her policy of advising municipal clients
that they should assume all suggestions made prior to a decision must satisfy the Nollan–Dolan
criteria).
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Future courts have an opportunity to clarify what will be seen as a
specific, concrete, and definite demand. Since Koontz extends the Nollan–
Dolan framework, that clarification should trench closely to the context
within which the demands arose in those cases. Nollan and Dolan
presented the Court with demands that were included in approved
development projects—imposed conditions. The California Coastal
Commission and the City of Tigard stated these demands with sufficient
specificity to incorporate them into the technical engineering specifications
of the development.270 Without doing so, the developer could not comply.
A framework consistent with the context of Nollan and Dolan would
require that a demand is “concrete” when the effect on the applicant is
measurable. A demand is “definite” when the board has made a
commitment that if the landowner incorporates the condition into the
application, the board will approve the application. A demand is “specific”
when the board describes the condition with sufficient detail to provide
clarity from an engineering perspective.
B. Comparing Apples (Imposed Demands) to Oranges (Proposed
Demands)
Without a clear framework indicating what constitutes a demand,
boards are left in a difficult position. If all suggestions must, prudently,
show a nexus and rough proportionality, boards will be at a disadvantage in
their negotiations. If they make suggestions without the requisite findings,
courts will judge any subsequent denial under heightened scrutiny. In this
sense, proposed demands are the apples to the oranges of imposed
demands. Demands imposed through an approved permit are a very
different beast than demands proposed prior to a denial. A post-decision
demand is easy to identify. For example, when requiring conveyance of a
public access easement in exchange for permission to build, the demand
specifies an amount of land and identifies a specific purpose. Landowners
must meet the specified conditions of approval to complete the
development. Courts, landowners, and land use boards can measure the
impact of a post-decision demand on the landowner and the community.
They can also measure the impact of the condition on the property value;
and, relevant to the Nollan–Dolan determination, the decision-making
record of the required approval process provides a rationale for postdecision demands.
On the other hand, many proposed demands lack the adequate
specificity described above. Land use boards often propose conditions,
during the review process prior to a denial, without the benefit of a full
record because the record is not yet complete. Boards cannot satisfy Nollan
270. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, *10–12; Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at
*7–8.
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and Dolan without adequate information about what the impacts of a
development will be. That information is usually not available early in the
approval process because most developers do not provide it until later
stages.
In imposed-condition cases—like Nollan and Dolan—the condition is a
by-product of a thorough and rigorous review process.271 In most states,
that review process includes extensive opportunity to exchange
information as part of the formal review procedure. This process often
takes weeks or months and involves gathering and processing information
from engineers, biologists, hydrologists, and a host of other experts. The
land use board, with help from their attorneys, must evaluate this
information along with information submitted by the public before
approving or denying the development.272 As a consequence of this
significant deliberation, a condition incorporated into—imposed on—an
approval is a product of a robust analysis with advice from many land use
professionals. Post-Koontz, land use boards must wait until the record is
sufficiently complete before they can make a proposal that they are sure
satisfies Nollan and Dolan.
For example, when the Nollan Court found that the condition imposing
public access to the beach exhibited no “nexus” to the governmental
purpose, the Court relied on an extensive record created by the California
Coastal Commission.273 The Court used that record to hold that the
Commission’s purpose in imposing the easement was to enhance the
public’s visual access to the ocean.274 Justice Scalia used that record to find
that a beachfront easement was not connected to enhancing visual access
from the road.275 In Dolan, the Court found that a condition requiring a
public easement was not roughly proportionate to the goal of traffic
271. See, e.g., Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, N.Y.C.,
APPLICANT PORTAL, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ap/step5_ulurp.shtml (last visited Nov. 27,
2014).
272. See, e.g., id.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 91–97.
274. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838–39 (1987) (finding that the California
Coastal Commission was attempting to enhance visual access and not physical access). However, in
reading the Commission’s brief, Justice Scalia seems to have missed an important point: the
Commission stated that they were not just protecting visual access but physical access. The enlarged
house would diminish visual access to the beach, the diminished visual access would lead to
diminished physical access, and, therefore, the beachfront easement was an effort to remedy that
condition by promoting physical access. Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at *8 (arguing that the
Nollan’s proposed house was “a visual impediment to public access” because “if the public cannot
see the coast, the public is not inclined to use it”). Justice Scalia saw the Commission’s purpose as
promoting visual access but not physical access; therefore, the condition was not connected. This
type of judicial confusion (or intentional distortion?) will become more common in the wake of
Koontz now that judges are obligated to subject proposed conditions to heightened scrutiny.
275. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838–40. But see id. at 850–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the trial record did show a nexus between the condition and the Commission’s authority).
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reduction because it was based on the rationale that it “could” reduce
traffic not “would” or even “was likely to.”276 The Court used the extensive
record created in the development approval process to evaluate the
condition and make the necessary determination of rough
proportionality.277 In addition, many development projects present a range
of interrelated issues. Adjusting one attribute of the project may require
similar adjustments to other components. How can a board ensure that
every suggestion satisfies Dolan’s “individualized determination”
requirement to show that any off-site mitigation proposals will address the
threatened harm before the application process defines that threatened
harm?
Negotiation proposals may not have the benefit of a complete record
when the parties generate them. Yet, post-Koontz, courts will evaluate
those proposals in light of the now-complete record. If a board makes a
suggestion early in the process and then denies the permit, that suggestion
must satisfy Nollan and Dolan to avoid being an unconstitutional
condition. This is particularly true of the rough proportionality prong that
requires “some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the proposed
development’s impact.”278 The Dolan Court held that a condition that
“could” mitigate harmful impacts is not sufficient to pass the “roughly
proportionate” test.279 Instead, only conditions that “will” or “are likely” to
mitigate impacts are constitutional.280 The conditions that amounted to
unconstitutional conditions in Nollan and Dolan were stated with
specificity in the final decision after the full deliberation of the required
process.281
Post-Koontz, land use boards offering proposals in development
processes should be wary of the standard to which they will be held if the
developer appeals any subsequent denial. Proposals to improve
noncompliant applications must be reasonably related to the governmental
purpose, and boards must make an individualized determination to show
276. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395–96 (1994) (“No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the
dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset
some of the traffic demand generated.”).
277. Id. at 389–91.
278. Id. at 391.
279. See id. at 395–96.
280. Id. at 395.
281. Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, at *3 (stating that the condition in Dolan “required
Petitioner to dedicate easements to allow the City to address flood hazards and traffic congestion,
problems caused by the proposed development”); Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at *8 (“At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Commission approved the Nollan permit subject to recordation of a
deed restriction acknowledging the right of the public to pass and repass across the narrow beach
between the ocean and the toe of the Nollans’ seawall.”).
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the requisite rough proportionality. Since the boards have the burden of
proving these two elements,282 they will need to create a record supporting
their proposals before any proposals are made to developers. This cuts off
the options for negotiation at an early stage in the process and thus reduces
the likelihood that an agreement will be reached.
IV. POST-KOONTZ OPTIONS FOR LAND USE BOARDS
Fortunately, boards have several options in addition to choosing a strict
diet of denials. When boards face a discretionary approval they can also
chose to: hire a mediator who can facilitate negotiation among the
stakeholders; negotiate without making offers; negotiate (despite the risks);
or attempt to insulate their negotiation process through pre-approval
processes and waiver.
A. Avoid Negotiation—Deny If Noncompliant and Approve If
Compliant
Land use boards need not negotiate. Since most land use boards are set
up as adjudicative bodies, they are not naturally equipped to negotiate.283
State and local laws define the required process that municipalities must
follow and do not require boards to interact with applicants beyond those
requirements. Boards receive the application, determine when the
application is complete, ensure all time frames are met, give notice of the
meetings, and provide an opportunity for public comment.284 Once the
boards have satisfied the requirements of the process, they can either
approve or deny the proposal based on the information submitted. If the
board does not propose or impose conditions, Nollan and Dolan will not
trigger heightened scrutiny. If the developer challenges the decision as a
taking, the developer must show that the decision violated Penn Central.
Justice Kagan noted this “avoid negotiation” option in her dissent in
Koontz: “If every suggestion could become the subject of a lawsuit under
Nollan and Dolan, the lawyer can give but one recommendation: Deny the
permits, without giving [the developer] any advice—even if he asks for
guidance.”285
This option presents difficulties, however. For development decisions,
where boards have the discretion to accept suggested improvements and
make their own suggestions, not negotiating will seem artificial.286
282. See supra text accompanying note 63.
283. Baker, supra note 198, at 455–56.
284. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 95–100.
285. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2611 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
286. Cf. Eagle, supra note 247, at 31–32 (arguing that because negotiation is an informal
process, fears about increasing municipal rigidity and absolutism are overstated); Merriam, supra
note 219, at 5 (pointing out that developers will want to negotiate).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4

212

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Municipalities adopt many ordinances that anticipate and encourage
negotiation. In New York, some planning boards have the authority to
require subdivision applicants to cluster the lots away from critical
community resources.287 Courts may view requesting that the applicant
cluster units as a demand that triggers heightened scrutiny. Not negotiating
will take discipline.
B. Facilitate Negotiation Among Stakeholders
Boards that decide not to negotiate can simultaneously encourage the
developer to negotiate directly with community stakeholders.288 This
negotiation could take place before or after the developer submits an
application.289 If the developer and the stakeholders reach an agreement,
the developer can integrate that agreement into the application and make it
part of the board’s decision. If the developer chooses to integrate any of the
conditions discussed in the negotiation, she does so voluntarily. Any
conditions included will be part of the developer’s application and then be
voted on by the board. This leaves open the option for negotiation but does
not require the board to participate. By not participating, the board does not
propose any conditions and the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan
will not apply if the developer appeals a subsequent denial.
Many boards have the discretion to promulgate rules outlining their
decision-making procedures and can use that discretion to encourage preapplication negotiations. In fact, there are many examples of these local
ordinances.290 These rules typically provide an opportunity for developers
to discuss their plans with neighbors prior to submitting a formal
application. For example, the City of San Francisco requires preapplication meetings between the developer and a prescribed group of
neighbors for new construction, alterations, and formal retail uses.291 Other
municipalities simply encourage negotiation with affected parties but do
287. See NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 219–22.
288. E.g., Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 486 (N.Y. 1997) (upholding the actions of a
land use board that facilitated a stakeholder negotiation as part of a special permit application).
289. See, e.g., Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 117–21
(documenting a case study where the developer submitted an as-of-right application while
simultaneously negotiating with community stakeholders).
290. The Gaining Ground database of land use ordinances cites eleven examples of preapplication and consensus building ordinances. Pre-Application & Consensus Building, GAINING
GROUND INFO. DATABASE, http://www.landuse.law.pace.edu/SPT--BrowseResources.php?
ParentId=762 (last visited Nov. 27, 2014).
291. Section 311 Pre-Application Process, S.F. PLANNING DEP’T, http://www.sfplanning.org/index.aspx?page=1575 (last visited Nov. 27, 2014) (“Pre-Application shall be
required for certain alterations proposed in all RH and RM Districts. The intent of the process is to:
(1) initiate neighbor communication to identify issues and concerns early on; (2) provide the project
sponsor the opportunity to address neighbor concerns prior to submitting their building permit
application; and (3) reduce the number of Discretionary Reviews (DRs) that would result in a public
hearing before the Planning Commission.”).
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not require it.292 Many municipalities also provide general information
intended to make the approval process more satisfying to citizens and
applicants.293 Highlighting the specific advantages of pre-application
negotiation can increase the likelihood that developers and stakeholders do
not miss the opportunity to identify mutually acceptable conditions early in
the process.
There may be barriers to this option. Some developers resist preapplication processes fearing that boards will use the added procedure to
delay an already lengthy and drawn-out process.294 In addition, citizens
often fear that pre-application negotiations will limit a board’s authority
later in the process.295 To allay these fears, local rules should state that any
agreement is only advisory and boards must review an agreement through
the required decision-making process.
Mediators may provide support when these types of obstacles arise.
When facing highly contentious decisions, a board can suggest that parties
hire a mediator to manage the negotiations.296 Some ordinances make this
292. See, e.g., Land Use Facilitation Program, CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,
http://www.cabq.gov/legal/adr/luf (last visited Nov. 27, 2014); Pre-Application & Consensus
Building for Borough of Red Bank, NJ, GAINING GROUND INFO. DATABASE,
http://landuse.law.pace.edu/landuse/documents/laws/reg2/BoroughofRedBankNJ-Pre-App&Cons
ensus.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2014).
293. See, e.g., Dep’t of Regulatory & Econ. Res. Zoning Process Improvement Project, PreApplication Process, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (June 2014), http://www.miamidade.gov/zoning
/library/guidelines/pre-application-process-summary.pdf; One Stop Shop, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS,
http://www.nola.gov/onestop/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2014); see also “One Stop Shop” for Building
Permits, NASHVILLE.GOV, http://www.nashville.gov/Codes-Administration/Construction-andPermits/One-Stop-Shop.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2014).
294. Cf. Brad Spangler, Decision-Making Delay, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (July 2003),
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/delay (“Normally, disputants use delay to deliberately
stall the decision making process.”).
295. Compare William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351, 1375 (1997) (“[T]here is
a subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) dynamic in the negotiation process that diminishes the
sanctity of the law as both the source of agency authority and its limit.”), with Philip J. Harter, Fear
of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389, 1418–20 (1997) (describing how
agency representatives have resisted implementing the results from collaborative processes), and
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (providing evidence from studies that negotiated rulemaking offers
efficiencies not possible in the required rule making process).
296. See Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLUIPA and the Mediation of
Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435, 462 (“[T]he highly contested nature of
religious land use disputes may eventually encourage local officials to try mediation.”); Matthew
McKinney et al., Commentary, Responding to Streams of Land Use Disputes, 60 PLAN. & ENVTL.
L., Apr. 2008, at 3 (discussing two studies demonstrating that negotiation and mediation can resolve
disputes over land use); John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Changing Times—Changing Practice:
New Roles for Lawyers in Resolving Complex Land Use and Environmental Disputes, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 7, 36 & n.101 (2010) (identifying seven states that have statutes that acknowledge
the importance of land use mediation); Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–93; cf.
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option explicit. For example, in the Town of Amenia, New York, a local
rule states the following:
At any point in a project review process the Planning
Board may, if it deems appropriate and the parties consent,
appoint a mediator to work informally with the applicant,
neighboring property owners, and other interested parties
to address concerns raised about the proposed Special
Permit use. Any party may request mediation.297
Mediators can help by identifying the right parties to involve, building
trust, improving communication, gathering relevant facts, identifying and
evaluating alternatives, and drafting agreements.298
One disadvantage of this option is that boards and their staff cannot
participate in the negotiation. If they do, any of their suggestions may be
subject to Nollan–Dolan scrutiny in a subsequent legal challenge. Many
land use boards have valuable expertise that would be useful to the parties.
Not having them at the table will decrease the efficiency of the negotiation.
Municipalities may have to complete studies that duplicate the preapplication process and the negotiators will not benefit from the board’s
expertise regarding what has worked in the past. For example, the District
in Koontz has a staff of experts who offer valuable information about the
application, adjacent parcels, and regional resources.299
Additionally, boards often conduct studies pursuant to their planning
function. These studies can identify threats to the community clarifying
what types of mitigation measures are appropriate. Boards also have
technical staff with expertise to help the parties find suitable ways to
reduce the impact of their development. If these staff are not part of any
negotiation, their expertise is not available to the parties during their
deliberations. If the parties reach an agreement with incomplete
information, a board may require that they reopen their negotiation to
address these issues and improve the agreement. While Koontz may
Rose, New Models, supra note 161, at 1168–70 (describing a model of land use decisions as forms
of mediation). See generally Jonathan M. Davidson & Susan L. Trevarthen, Land Use Mediation:
Another Smart Growth Alternative, 33 URB. LAW. 705 (2001) (highlighting recent research and
examples of mediated land use settlements).
297. Special Permits and Site Plan Review for Town of Amenia, NY, GAINING GROUND INFO.
DATABASE, http://landuse.law.pace.edu/landuse/documents/laws/reg2/AmeniaNY-PreApp&ADR.doc (last
visited Nov. 27, 2014).
298. See, e.g., JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOVE, MIDDLE VOICE; MEDIATING CONFLICT
SUCCESSFULLY 23–28 (2009); SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 204, at 140–50; Howard
Bellman & Susan Podziba, Public Policy Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2012, at 14; Ane
D. Deister, Environmental Mediation Strategies for Success: Summaries of Two Consensus-Based
Cases—Florida’s Growth Management Act Legislation and the Los Angeles River Watershed Task
Force, 32 URB. LAW. 73, 93 (2000).
299. See Organizational Structure, ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DISTRICT,
http://floridaswater.com/organization/organization_chart.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2014).
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encourage more stakeholder negotiations, not involving the board reduces
their efficiency. Developers and the community would be better served if
the board could offer its expertise to the negotiations.
The confidentiality provisions of mediation may provide an avenue for
boards to offer suggestions during negotiations. By protecting a board’s
suggestions through the mediation process, it may be possible to avoid
missing out on the board’s expertise. Unfortunately, this alternative is
cumbersome because the actual route to protect a board’s suggestions
would require a mediator to enter caucus—a separate session—with the
board to elicit suggestions and then communicate those suggestions to the
other side as if they came from the mediator.300 The obvious inefficiencies
of this approach would likely reduce its effectiveness. This option is also
imperfect because not all mediations can rely on confidentiality
protections.301 A future court, concerned with protecting landowners from
extortionate demands, could decide to override any promised
confidentiality of mediation.302
C. Negotiate Without Offering Conditions
A similarly inefficient alternative for avoiding heightened scrutiny
would be to allow the board to negotiate but not to make any proposals.
For example, the board can tell the developer that a proposal does not
adequately protect wetlands but then not propose any mitigation
alternatives. In this way, the board never makes a demand and never
triggers the scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. If the developer does not change
the application the board can deny the permit and any Fifth-Amendment
takings claim by the developer will be subject to Penn Central and not
Nollan–Dolan.
If the developer wanted to avoid a denial, she could suggest mitigation
measures hoping that such an alternative would satisfy the board. The
complication with this option is how this negotiation would integrate with
the required decision-making process. If the developer identifies an
300. See Richard M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting Conciliation Back into the Process:
The Peacemaking Approach to Resolution, Peace, and Healing, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 270, 283
(2006) (describing the purpose and practice of caucus in mediation).
301. Susan Oberman, Confidentiality in Mediation: An Application of the Right to Privacy, 27
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 539, 541 (2012) (“There is no uniformity in confidentiality protections
between state and federal laws, among the states, or even among localities within states.”); Note,
Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441 (1984) (“Under current law,
however, it is far from clear that a mediator can back up a promise that everything said in mediation
will remain confidential . . . .”).
302. See Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 33
(2003) (“Few . . . statutes, however, acknowledge the authority of a court to override the
confidentiality privilege to enforce participation orders, address claims of participant misconduct, or
to prevent abuse of process or professional ethics violations.”).
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acceptable option, the board cannot commit to an approval prematurely.
The board is required to follow the required process before rendering a
binding decision. Doing so would make the board’s decision vulnerable to
a procedural challenge. While this alternative protects the board from
heightened scrutiny, this inefficient form of negotiation increases
transaction costs for all involved. The developer will have to spend more
time in the approval process. The community will have to wait longer for
any benefits from the development and may even have to fund litigation.
The board will waste valuable time playing “hot or cold” with the
developer instead of addressing other important decisions.
D. Negotiate
A board may decide that negotiating with developers over potential
exactions is worth the added judicial scrutiny. It can still use the approval
process to offer suggestions about how to mitigate the impact of a
proposed development. The majority opinion in Koontz does not prevent
these conversations. It does, however, require boards to have a greater level
of certainty—a nexus and rough proportionality—when offering
suggestions. As a result, municipalities must conduct a rigorous analysis
before proposing conditions because research indicates that governments
fail heightened scrutiny half of the time on appeal.303 If the negotiations
collapse and the developer decides to sue, a court will require the board to
show that its proposals meet the Nollan–Dolan standard.
Therefore, boards should only enter into land use negotiations when
they have reliable and up-to-date information that can justify the nexus and
rough proportionality requirements,304 and the development promises
sufficient community benefit to warrant the risk of litigation and a possible
adverse ruling. This will be difficult in practice since the project details are
often malleable in the early stages of a development application.
E. Insulate Negotiations—Ensure Proposals Do Not Become
Demands
Governments may attempt to insulate their negotiations from triggering
heightened scrutiny by specifying when a proposal becomes a demand.
303. See Echeverria, supra note 124, at 7 & n.38 (citing research of appellate decisions
applying the “rough proportionality” test revealing that the “government flunks the test about half
the time”).
304. If boards do not have this information they can ask developers to provide funds to
conduct studies. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.9(a)(1) (2014) (“The project
sponsor or the lead agency, at the project sponsor’s option, will prepare the draft [Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)]. If the project sponsor does not exercise the option to prepare the draft EIS,
the lead agency will prepare it, cause it to be prepared or terminate its review of the action. A fee
may be charged by the lead agency for preparation or review of an EIS pursuant to section 617.13
of this Part. When the project sponsor prepares the draft EIS, the document must be submitted to
the lead agency.”).
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While the Court used imprecise language to define the triggering behavior,
an argument can be made that Koontz only applies to specific, concrete,
and definite demands.305 Therefore, indefinite proposals that are not
concrete and specific are not considered demands. Accordingly, a board
that specifies when a proposal amounts to a demand may be able to avoid
being subject to heightened scrutiny. But given the Supreme Court’s
demonstrated hostility to similar maneuvers in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz
the Justices will likely view any efforts to insulate negotiations with
suspicion.
Boards may be able to use pre-application processes and development
agreements to insulate their negotiations.306 Many boards have used preapplication processes to address important issues before the rigidity of the
required process interferes with parties’ ability to communicate.307 By
conducting negotiations before an application is finally accepted, the board
may be able to avoid heightened scrutiny. A community may create a prenegotiation process to explore the impacts of the development and possible
mitigation measures. Boards can issue a rule explaining that any of the
ideas in this pre-application problem-solving workshop are not demands
until they become part of an application.
One problem with this approach is timing. Early-stage negotiations may
lack sufficient information to produce mutually agreeable and efficient
outcomes. In order to understand the true impacts of a project, the board
needs details about what the developer will build, how she will build it,
and where. The board must then use that information to identify mitigating
measures. Further, information about harms may not be available in the
early stages of the approval process because of inadequate information
about what is being proposed. Identifying this information takes time and
money and landowners are only willing to invest those resources if there is
a reasonable likelihood of success in the approval process. Therefore,
replacing negotiation opportunities at the end of the process with preapplication negotiation is problematic because it can leave on the table
value that might normally be discovered later in the process.
Another problem with these attempts to insulate is the Court’s concern
over circumventing the Takings Clause. The majority opinions in Nollan,
Dolan, and now Koontz, make it clear that boards cannot do indirectly
305. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (2013).
306. Compare Callies et al., supra note 83, at 17–18 (suggesting that development
agreements—agreements between government and landowners that lock land use regulations in
place for a discrete time frame—can also be used to insulate development negotiations), with
Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 222, at 681–83 (arguing that in order for developer agreements to
offer widespread relief from the pressures of Koontz, they must be authorized by a well-drafted
statute, and noting that only thirteen states permit their use).
307. See, e.g., Peter A. Buchsbaum, Bibliography, Permit Coordination Study by the Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, 36 URB. LAW. 191, 218 (2004) (summarizing a study that points out the
benefits of pre-application processes).
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what they cannot do directly.308 If boards cannot avoid the Fifth
Amendment using a proposed condition prior to a decision, will courts
allow them to do so using a proposed condition before the developer
submits an application? Again, this lack of clarity comes from the Court’s
unwillingness to define what amounts to a demand. Identifying the moment
that transforms a “proposal” to a “demand” will be very difficult for
boards.
How does a board know when its proposal crosses the threshold of
specificity and concreteness? Is it when the board specifically incorporates
the condition into an application as a written alternative? Is it when the
board makes a condition with concreteness to measure the impact? While
proposals offered in a pre-application process may not be adequately
concrete and specific, any affirmative statement that they are is conjecture
subject to a contrary ruling by a reviewing court.
Another option for insulating negotiation is to ask the developer to
waive her right to a compensated taking.309 Professor Daniel Farber
suggests that this type of a waiver may be permissible under certain
circumstances: “Despite the Declaration of Independence’s proclamation
of inalienable rights, constitutional rights are indeed alienable in the sense
that they can be waived in return for various benefits. . . . [T]he right to a
jury trial can be surrendered in return for a lighter sentence as part of a plea
bargain.”310
Could the right to be justly compensated be surrendered in return for an
approval to build a noncompliant development? Professor Farber
concludes that ultimately the Court’s rulings dealing with development
conditions are not likely to permit the possibility of a waiver unless revised
by future Courts.311 Since these are essentially the facts of Nollan, Dolan,
and Koontz, he is probably correct. Based on the opinions in those cases, it
308. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598–99 (“[I]f the government had directly seized the
easements it sought to obtain through the permitting process, it would have committed a per se
taking.”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“[H]ad the city simply required
petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the
grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred.”);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (“Had California simply required the
Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in
order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their
house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”); Sullivan,
supra note 59, at 1505 (describing how Nollan fits with the other unconstitutional conditions
doctrine cases and reiterating the Court’s conclusion that “[b]eing offered a building permit on the
condition that one surrender an easement to the public clearly pressures the right against
uncompensated taking if ‘direct’ requisition of the easement would constitute a taking”).
309. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2006) (raising the question of when
and how the right to a constitutional protection can be waived).
310. Id. at 914 (footnotes omitted).
311. See id. at 951.
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is hard to imagine how a waiver would be seen as anything but
“extortionate” behavior. However, until that question is answered, some
land use boards may decide that requesting a waiver is a worthwhile
alternative to forgoing negotiation.
CONCLUSION
Koontz will certainly not kill land use negotiations. Developers and
land use boards receive too many benefits from the creative bargaining that
negotiations allow. However, Koontz changes the balance of power among
the parties, so some retreat from negotiation is inevitable. The Court’s
decision in Koontz severely limits the ability of land use boards to work
with developers who present noncompliant proposals. According to Coy
Koontz Jr., the decision “will give [developers] a bigger stick to take into
court in the future to fight these types of cases.”312 It is hard to imagine a
future in which land use boards do not retreat from negotiations over
noncompliant applications.
Hopefully, future courts will provide more guidance on what types of
behaviors amount to demands triggering Nollan–Dolan scrutiny. The only
definition given by the Supreme Court is that demands for property are
definite, concrete, and specific.313 There is no guidance beyond the plain
meaning of these words. Future courts may be able to provide further
guidance as to the meanings of these words.
One of the many questions after Koontz is whether the Court’s efforts to
protect a few developers from potentially extortionate behavior will harm a
much greater number of developers. This Article argues that it will. PostKoontz boards must now spend more time and money ensuring that
proposed development conditions meet the same rigorous standard as
imposed conditions under Nollan and Dolan. Sensible boards will
construct protection around their development negotiations to ensure that
suggestions are only made when they can satisfy the heightened standard of
scrutiny. These increased protections may reduce the likelihood that boards
use development processes for illegitimate and extortionate purposes;
however, the increased transaction costs will undoubtedly place more
burdens—and costs—on developers, planners, and municipalities.

312. Jacobs, supra note 30.
313. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
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